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Introduction

The endurance of Arab authoritarian regimes has been quite daunting, especially
with the rise of the Arab Spring. Some Arab regimes have ruled with domination and
repression since the nineteenth century. These regimes stand out globally with respect to
the number of democratic countries. Even with the recent rebellions, the rise of the Arab
Spring, starting in 2011, a number of Arab regimes still continue to thrive and remain in
tact under authoritarian rule. This includes quite a number of Arab states that have faced
uprisings during the Arab Spring, but have not implemented a new democratic system or
elected a new leader, such as Syria. With this fascinating reality of Arab authoritarian
regimes, I set out to find the reason for the endurance of Arab authoritarian regimes,
noting that this was not a simple coincidence. My goal was to find out what exactly
allowed Arab authoritarian regimes to remain stable, whether it was political strategies or
economic resources, even in the face of the Arab Spring. Overall, I was determined to
obtain a grip on one solid and plausible reason as to why Arab authoritarian leaders have
endured for so long, or at least a brief number of reasons. Arab authoritarianism has
allowed the regimes to endure since the nineteenth century and continue to do so with
protests and grievances amongst citizens.
I decided to choose the topic of Arab authoritarian endurance because I
understood the importance in exposing the backbone of the regimes. I truly believe that
learning about the reasons for Arab authoritarian endurance empowers people of all
backgrounds with the knowledge of strategies that dictates the lives of people in Arab
states. Not only does this topic allow people to understand the power of Arab regimes in
being able to rule with a strong fist, but also enables people to comprehend how most
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Arab authoritarian regimes are able to continue to real with a stable regime even with the
recent Arab uprisings. The endurance of Arab authoritarianism is most important in being
able to analyze and compare Arab regimes that have fallen to the Arab Spring and the
ones that continue to maintain durability.
In order to complete this research task, I embarked on extensive research and used
various methodologies. My thesis is split into four sections, with two main chapters. My
first section is the literature review. I completed this portion by researching a broad range
of arguments by a number of different scholars, such as the politicized education system,
the condition of the coercive forces, hydrocarbon exports, and so on for the endurance of
Arab authoritarian regimes. These arguments included reasons prior to the Arab Spring.
The arguments used in my literature review all fall under political, economic, cultural,
security, or educational reasons.
My two main chapters consist of Jordan and Algeria. I chose these two regimes as
my core chapters to create a balanced argument, as Jordan is a constitutional monarchy
and Algeria is a semi-presidential republic. My methodologies for these chapters included
conducting extensive research on each country with concern to the recent protests,
government responses, and theories amongst scholars as to why these regimes continue to
endure even after the Arab Spring. I also learned about the structure of each regime, such
as its components, government supporters, government opponents, and security forces. I
provided the structure of each regime in the beginning of each core chapter. Each of these
countries have unique factors specific to their endurance, which helped me produce a
compelling thesis.
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The last section of my thesis includes a conclusion. My conclusion wraps up my
entire thesis. I provided similarities and differences between Jordan and Algeria for the
protests, government responses, and theories for the endurance of each country. In
regards to the protests, I explained similarities and differences between Jordan and
Algeria for the grievances, general ideals, organization, location, injuries, and the amount
of security. As for the government responses, I provided similarities and differences for
the economic and political responses. In regards to the theories, I included overlapping
political theories for the endurance of each regime. I also focused on overlapping
political, security, and economic reasons between the theories in the literature review and
the theories for my core cases. I also provided results specific to each country for all of
these areas. Finally, I discussed how adequate the literature review theories matched up
to Jordan and Algeria, as well as arguments that should be added to the literature review
theories. Lastly, I touched upon approaches from the literature review that were not
widely argued by theorists for Jordan and Algeria.
My findings did not end up including one solid and plausible reason as to why
Arab authoritarian leaders have endured for so long, but rather a number of reasons for
the lasting regimes. I argued that the main reasons for the endurance of Arab
authoritarian regimes fall under political means, which were overlapping arguments for
the core cases of Jordan and Algeria. These arguments include the creation of reforms
and promises, the threat of chaos, and societal cleavages. My findings also included
theories that fit with the literature. These arguments fall under political, security, and
economic reasons. These arguments include legitimacy, multi-party system,
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patrimonialism, resource wealth, international support, internal disagreements, and
coercive security forces.
The arguments reveal that each Arab authoritarian regime is able to endure due to
distinct reasons, as each regime is different. However the theories of legitimacy, multiparty system, patrimonialism, resource wealth, international support, internal
disagreements, and coercive security forces stand out as the main arguments, as the
reasons are common amongst almost all Arab authoritarian regimes. Overall, I argue that
there is not one specific reason for the endurance of Arab authoritarian regimes, but
rather different reasons under various categories that fit the majority of the Arab states.
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Literature Review

Various theorists have argued about the reasons for this endurance of Arab
authoritarian regimes. Some scholars have overlapping arguments, while many reasons
clash. Overall most fall under political, economic, cultural, security, or educational
reasons.
Among various arguments, political issues seem to be the most popular reasons
among theorists for the endurance of Arab regimes. For instance, a number of scholars
specifically point to the use of the multi-party system. Posusney claims that the
oppositional groups have nowhere to move under this system because they are restricted
under almost every area (Authoritarianism, 95). This includes the media, campaign
activities, simple formation and registration as a political party. Incomplete
parliamentarization, liberalized autocracies, the abundance of independent candidates,
and financial fragility further restrict opposition groups. With respect to the media, the
regime has complete control. The media is extremely restricted, especially for opposition
parties. For example, radio stations need their programs approved by the secret police and
one newspaper editor claimed “we can barely bring ourselves to express our opinions to
our wives in our bedrooms and even then we are afraid” when responding to a question
with regards to obeying the secret police about his cartoon section (The Media Relations
195). One Jordanian columnist even claimed, “I feel like I am two people…on the one
hand I am addressing the readers, but part of me is addressing all the security services
watching me” (The Media Relations 197). When it comes to the regime, the government
controls the media, using it to its own advantage and “creat[ing] the impression of
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popular mandate for the leader” (Authoritarianism 95). Essentially the media is caged
and opposition parties are unable to use it to their benefit.
When it comes to campaign activities and voting, opposition parties face many
restraints. During the election, voters are often coerced if they support the challenger
(Authoritarianism 91). Macfarquhar uses Qudah, a Jordanian poet, as an example. Qudah
was jailed by the secret police after simply reciting a poem regarding Jordan’s political
system (The Media Relations 192). Even though opposition parties face major setbacks
due to restricted media coverage and campaign activities, creating the actual party itself is
the most challenging. Posusney explains how new political parties need to register with
the government to receive their permission for creation. Either this takes too long for the
group to stay active, or its application is denied (Authoritarianism 95). Opposition parties
end up working alone, which is completely ineffective (The Media Relations 180).
Posusney and Macfarquhar mainly argue the restrictions political parties face that inhibit
them from effectively seeking change in the government.
Most scholars do not disagree with Posusney and Macfarquhar, as most Arab
regimes have instilled restrictions that do in fact limit opposition parties under a multiparty system. Still, some believe that certain aspects of the multi-party system are more
significant than others in terms of sustaining the weakness of the opposition parties.
Among the various other restrictions that the opposition parties face, Vicki Langhor also
lists election fraud, repressive ruling, deficient access to public meeting spaces, and the
mass mobilization of government security at protests. Langhor believes that these
handicaps certainly slow down any opposition parties, but she argues that incomplete
parliamentarization, a lack of voters due to the prevalence of independent candidates, and
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financial constraints are the most important, as they limit opposition parties in
particularly powerful ways. Insufficient parliamentarization refers to “significant
deviations from general parliamentary procedure[s] such as allowing unelected upper
houses to censure governments obstruct elected representatives” (Langhor 202). With
incomplete parliamentarization, the government is able to diminish the influence of
opposition parties, even when they win a large quantity of seats (Langhor 202).
Relatedly, Brumberg illustrates a more broad aspect of some Arab regimes that
allow them to continue to thrive: liberalized autocracy. Under this system, “a set of
interdependent institutional, economic, ideological, social and geostrategic factors has
created an adaptable ecology of repression, control, and partial openness” (“The Trap of
Liberalized 57”). The idea is to create a regime with political openness, or perceived
political openness. Through this system the state is constantly loosening and then
tightening the restrictions on the rival parties, which completely throws them off balance
and unable to improve as parties. Also, the periods of openness allow the parties to blow
off steam so they do not build up anger towards an uprising (“Democratization Versus
Liberalization”).
The entire political ecosystem of a liberalized autocracy contributes to the
survival of these partial autocracies and the power of the ruler, and as a result, the Arab
leader refuses to relinquish any of their control over the regime. In some Arab countries,
such as Algeria, Morocco, and Kuwait, the leaders will expand this idea and give some
opposition groups representation in parliament. Some regimes even incorporate the
process of “Islamization,” where Islamists will gain small-scale ideological and
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bureaucratic control, but in reality they do not have much influence over the regime
(“The Trap of Liberalized 57”).
Furthermore, Langhor explains the importance of the abundance of independent
candidates surrounded by other competing candidates. This inhibits the opposition parties
because they take away a large number of seats that would have gone to the opposition
parties (Langhor 205). Also, the abundance of independent candidates hurts the
opposition parties because they weaken the progress of party programs. These party
programs could be established as party alternatives to the authoritarian regime and take
away its support (Langhor 203). Langhor argues “the prevalence of independent
candidacy among non-ruling party candidates weakens the chances for effective
opposition to authoritarian regimes by preventing the formation of well-defined
alternatives that can win popular support” (Langhor 205).
Lastly, Langhor emphasizes the financial fragility of opposition parties. This is
mainly due to the fact that opposition parties do not have the business elites on their side
because their interests or platforms do not overlap with the upper class. Rather, business
elites look more towards sectoral groups because business opportunities are more
controlled by authoritarian regimes. On top of this issue, the opposition parties have to
rely on the government for finances and as a result, they aren’t provided with many funds
to act as a functional party and win support (Langhor 205).
Among these various restrictions under the multi-party system, Lust-Okar argues
that the government’s censorship of the more radical parties inhibits the more moderate
oppositional parties from succeeding. In this case, Lust-Okar points out that the
government may decide to restrict certain parties in elections, while others are granted the
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privilege to compete in elections, which creates moderation among the included groups
(“Enduring Arab” 131). The moderates “fear that an alliance with excluded groups could
force the regime to punish the moderates by further constricting their avenues for
participation” (“Enduring Arab” 132). Essentially the moderating opposition parties lose
numbers as a result of fear that they will be completely shut down by the government if
they align with the excluded groups (“Enduring Arab” 132).
Although the multi-party system is significant, the perceived legitimacy of the
Arab regimes is another politics-oriented approach to understanding the conditions that
allow the Arab regimes to endure. Dawisha writes, “Arab leaders constantly endeavor to
win their populations’ acceptance of or at least acquiescence to their leadership, usually
by portraying themselves as meritorious and successful” (Dawisha 525). By creating an
image as a popular and successful leader, the population believes that the regime is
legitimate and working for the people. Dawisha also emphasizes how Arab regimes have
formed hierarchical social systems, which appear to be legitimate with the authoritative
figure at the top. As a result, Arab regimes lack insurgent tendencies among their citizens
(Dawisha 525).
This hierarchical structure is further evident in Arab regimes that have had one
tribe or one clique control the government over a long period of time. Macfarquhar
reveals this structure in Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia, the Saud family and Wahabi
clerics formed an alliance early in the 18th century and still reign today. This gives them
complete control over Saudi society and the people. Macfarquhar writes, “the clerical
hierarchy views even the idea of laws emanating from public debate with suspicion, as if
that process might erode G-d’s mandate” (255). The majority of princes are the only ones
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that can bring about change in Saudi Arabia and it’s understood that it won’t occur
anytime soon (The Media Relations 254).
On top of the hierarchal structure with the perceived strong leader, Dawisha
believes that the religion of Islam and the relationship between past and present
conditions legitimize the regime to the citizens. With respect to the Islamic religion,
renowned Muslim jurists ingrained significant imperatives that became a part of the
religion’s heritage. Muslims feel the need to follow these significant imperatives today.
They “prescribed total obedience to the ruler by fostering the belief that rebellion was the
most heinous of crimes — a doctrine consecrated in the juristic maxim” (Dawisha 525).
In regards to past and present experiences, memories of the past may change their view
on the present, but the present conditions override these thoughts, such as modernization.
Modernization and other transforming environments have strengthened the Arab people,
as changing social conditions have delegitimized authoritarianism and traditional values
with advanced education and Westernization. Even so, these present conditions have
boosted Arab leaders even more so than the ruled because advanced technology has
provided regimes with “access to methods of suppression that made earlier methods pale
by comparison” (Dawisha 526). Also, through propaganda acts of creating new
economic, social, and foreign policies that appear to be achievements and developments,
Arab authoritarian leaders have been able to win the support of their citizens (Dawisha
526). Ultimately, Dawisha argues that citizens under Arab regimes perceive the regime to
be legitimate due to factors relating to hierarchal political structures, the imperatives of
Islam, and the power of present conditions.
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Whitaker presents two different political reasons for the lasting Arab regimes:
patrimonialism and Western support. The argument about patrimonialism differs from
Dawisha’s argument about perceived legitimacy. Whitaker claims that those at the top of
the hierarchal structure do not turn against the regime because they are basically “bought
off.” In this case, the leader will buy off those in the family, tribe, and other dependent
groups with jobs, key appointments, and business privileges (Whitaker 97). These favors
and resources will be denied to opponents of the regime, but the system guarantees the
political support of the influential citizens in society (Whitaker 93). Whitaker explains,
“holding the reins of power allows Arab regimes to grant business privileges to
themselves or to others in exchange for support, or to restrict the business activities of
those who are out of favour” (Whitaker 97). Since the opponents are denied resources,
they are unable to develop as a rising power, while those at the top help the regime grow
because they are pleased with their patronage (Whitaker 97).
Whitaker also argues that Western support has created lasting Arab regimes.
Many Arab regimes have been able to keep a fairly solid relationship with the West,
which Whitaker finds to be significant because it helps them stay on the path towards
modernity and most importantly, it keeps the West from coming down hard on the
regimes (Whitaker 106). The Arab regimes have been able to keep these relationships at a
balance, where they still receive support from the West, but they don’t run into
unfavorable domestic repercussions that can harm the legitimacy of the regime. Western
support has come in the form of economic aid and military assistance, which has helped
Arab regimes endure with financial help to strengthen the regime and extra security
forces to fight off any opponents. To keep the West happy and the citizens from forming

Berger 13
grievances, the regimes will act as if they are emerging democracies without fully
reforming. For example, Whitaker explains how Saudi Arabia implemented local
government elections in 2005, but women weren’t even able to vote and the royal family
allocated fifty percent of the seats (Whitaker 107). The Arab regimes essentially set up a
system where they are able to keep everyone content, including the West, without fully
reforming and revealing their true reliance on the West.
Lastly amongst political reasons, Langhor and Whitaker point to other civil
society groups, aside from political parties. Langhor believes that there is too much civil
society and not enough politics to build a democracy. Langhor reveals how Arab citizens
take a bigger role in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society
groups rather than in political parties. The Arab citizenry would rather partake in NGOs
because they appeal to specific interests and allow citizens to raise funds much more
easily, but they are not promising for democratization for the long run (Langhor 193).
The main issue with NGOs is their advocacy focus, which is usually for a specific issue
or goal. For example, Langhor explains that an NGO can be focused only on human
rights issues, which is not productive enough to mobilize a wider range of constituencies
around the more significant issue of democratization (Langhor 195).
In opposition to Langhor, Whitaker believes that civil society is too weak, which
fuels the endurance of Arab regimes. Just like political parties, civil society groups, such
as NGOs, and press publications need to apply for a license. Whitaker explains how Arab
citizens don’t even apply for licenses because they have witnessed the government
decline licenses far too many times. For example, Hisham Kassem, an Egyptian citizen,
attempted to create a weekly news magazine, but “recognizing that in the previous ten
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years only four political weeklies and one monthly had been granted licenses, and that the
founders of all four weeklies had strong connections with the government, Kassem
decided not to bother applying for a license” (Whitaker 180). Even worse, the Saudis
need the approval of the king just to form a civil society organization based on human
rights or corruption (Whitaker 181). The restrictions will vary across each Arab regime,
but overall Whitaker argues that civil society is extremely weak under Arab regimes
because civic and social organizations do not have the power nor resources to come
together as a group and discuss grievances.
In addition to political reasons, a large number of economic reasons for lasting
authoritarianism under the Arab regimes have advanced. Under this approach, several
theorists, including Whitaker and Macfarquhar, believe that many Arab regimes are able
to thrive due to their extensive income from hydrocarbon exports, foreign aid, and rents.
Whitaker and Macfarquhar believe these sources of income place the regimes in a good
enough economic stance, where they do not need to implement an income tax, keeping
the citizens at ease and happy with the government, especially when taxes are compared
to ones in the United States. Whitaker explains, “english history might have taken a
different course if Charles, like many Arab rulers today, had been able to draw on other
financial resources, such as oil. He might well have stayed in power, regardless of his
unpopularity, and continued to rule without recourse to parliament” (Whitaker 102).
Essentially many Arab regimes are able to rely on resources such as oil to build the state
and they do not have to worry about pressure by their citizens for accountability because
the levels of taxation are extremely low, especially direct income taxes. Whitaker argues
that citizens would move towards a demand for democracy if taxes were high because
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they would call for a voice in how the taxes are distributed (Whitaker 102). Brumberg
somewhat disagrees with this argument, mainly in regards to oil money, because there are
many Arab regimes that rely on oil as their source of income, but are not total autocracies
(“The Trap of Liberalized” 57).
Macfarquhar agrees with Whitaker, but focuses on Saudi Arabia. Macfarquhar
writes, “indulgence toward reformists tends to rise and fall in tandem with the price of
oil—in lean times, the royals are more prone to react to grievances than when they are
flush with cash and feel they can buy everyone off” (255). Not only does Macfarquhar
argue that Saudi Arabia, like many other Arab states, has low taxation policies, but also
the al-Sauds use their oil income in a patrimonial way. Reformists in Saudi Arabia are
paid off and therefore choose not to act as dissidents. Out of all the known reserves,
Saudi Arabia has total authority over one quarter of them, which allows the al-Sauds to
exercise “complete control over the world’s richest oil resources” (The Media Relations
254). The number of dissidents in Saudi Arabia has declined immensely as many of them
have become millionaires, allowing Saudi Arabia to prosper as an authoritarian regime
(The Media Relations 255).
Whitaker and Macfarquhar may argue that the regime is rich from hydrocarbon
exports, foreign aid, and rent, but some scholars emphasize that in many Arab regimes,
the people themselves are poor. This economic condition leads to poor education, low
literacy rates, and inequality. Bellin writes, “it is not unusual for a fifth of the population
in a given country to fall below the poverty line, 32 percent of adults are illiterate, and
MENA states rank in the bottom half of the UN’s human development index despite the
enormous wealth of several MENA countries” (Authoritarianism 23). As a result of these
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conditions, the elite and masses tend to forget about democratic reform and focus their
attention on these issues. The masses don’t view democratic reform as essential with
these conditions on their hands and the elite are not fearful of the economic issues.
Therefore, there are not many groups between the masses and the elite that strive for
democratic reform (Authoritarianism 23).
Along with political and economic reasons, cultural reasons play a huge role
among many theorists. The most popular argument among cultural reasons concerns the
Arab culture and Islamic religion. The Islamic religion was previously discussed under
political reasons, but only with regard to the fact that aspects of the religion created a
perceived legitimacy for the political leader. Luciani claims that Islam, as the main
religion among Arabs, tends to shape their cultural attitudes. The Islamic religion is such
a dominant part of many Arabs’ lives that it is “much more than a system of spiritual
guidance; it is accepted as a comprehensive social, political, legal and cultural system,
and as such, even after years of ‘modernisation’ and ‘secularisation’, Islam remains a
powerful and pervasive force in the Arab world” (Luciani 287). Luciani highlights the
supremacy of the Islamic religion among Arabs and its power to form cultural views.
Luciani expands the notion of how Islam shapes cultural attitudes and explains
how renowned Muslim jurists and various theologians carried on the importance of the
Islamic religion after the prophet passed away and turned it into a central authority.
Through the worldview of these jurists and theologians, Arabs today believe that,
“‘rebelling is the most heinous of crimes’ and ‘sixty years of tyranny are better than one
hour of civil strife’” (Luciani 288). They even implemented claims of the Caliph
regarding obedience to the leader. Ultimately, these claims became embodied within the
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Arab culture and Luciani argues that Arabs’ adherence to the Islamic religion shapes the
way in which they react towards authority, or rather the inaction they take against the
government. Luciani believes that the Islamic religion, or at least the version that
renowned jurists and theologians have passed down, explains the endurance of Arab
authoritarianism for the most part (288).
Whitaker also points to Islam as the main reason for Arab authoritarian
endurance. Whitaker doesn’t exactly touch upon the ways in which Islam has been passed
down to discourage the formation of opposition groups and uprisings, rather, he explains
the importance of Islam’s message that fosters complete obedience to the Arab leader.
Since Islam is embedded in the Arab culture, Arab citizens strictly follow the Islamic
religion. Rather than a separation between church and state, Arab regimes fuse religion
and the state, where Arab leaders rule with the power of g-d and build on the negative
connotations associated with secularism (Whitaker 137). Therefore Arab citizens are
completely compliant to the Arab leader because at the end of the day, the law comes
from “g-d” (Whitaker 144). As a result, “g-d’s laws”, or the regime’s laws overrides
popular sovereignty.
Along with Luciani and Whitaker, Brumberg mentions the significance of Islam,
but in terms of the way in which Arab rulers use it to gain the title as “supporters of the
Islamic community and Arab nation” (“The Trap of Liberalized” 58). Since Islam has
taken an important role in the lives of many Arabs, they are able to relate to one another
and come together as a community. Arab leaders manipulate this commonality and act in
a way that makes them look like they are completely devoted to the Islamic community
and citizens in general, and not just the regime itself. Brumberg refers to this condition as
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“the ‘harmonic’ foundation of legitimacy: Total autocracies spread the idea that the
state’s mission is to defend the supposedly unified nature of the Arab nation or the
Islamic community” (“The Trap of Liberalized” 58).
Another cultural argument explaining lasting Arab regimes is the significance of
family honor. Whitaker labels this phenomenon as the “gilded cage” because Arabs will
be able to use family connections to go very far in life. However there are many
restrictions involved, especially for women, which keep them in the cage of family honor.
This cultural aspect among Arab families has a great impact on the regimes because
“regimes are products of the societies they govern” (Whitaker 48-49). Whitaker explains
how these household relationships reflect the political regime, where citizens will act
obediently to the regime because they were brought up to keep family honor and stay
duteous to their clan or tribe. Whitaker writes, “the patriarchal attitudes observed at
ground level in the family are replicated throughout society, right up to the top, rulers and
political leaders are cast in the image of the father” (Whitaker 52). Macfarquhar agrees
with Whitaker with regard to the reason of family honor, but he mainly uses the case
study of Saudi Arabia to present this argument. Women are forced to stay in the private
sphere for the most part, as they need permission from their husbands to go places, they
are not allowed to drive, and they must be fully covered outside the home (The Media
Relations 262). Ultimately, many Arab households demand obedience to the family
honor, which keeps the citizens in line as submissive beings to the regime.
In addition to political, economic, and cultural arguments, many scholars believe
that the amount of coercion and security used by Arab regimes is the main factor
contributing to the endurance of authoritarianism in the Arab world. Brumberg and
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Brownlee touch upon similar examples associated with coercion. Brumberg focuses on
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, explaining that the main concern of the regimes is to build
up their security forces and “to absorb or repress rival political voices” (“The Trap of
Liberalized” 58). Brumberg points out the risks of these actions, such as the loyalty of the
security forces. For example, in Saudi Arabia, a close alliance has been formed between
the House of Saud and Wahabi institutions, but the Wahabi religious establishments can
revolt against the regime at any time and join Islamist opposition forces (“The Trap of
Liberalized” 58). Even so, Brumberg still considers these coercive forces to be one of the
main reasons for Arab authoritarian endurance.
Brownlee also argues that the condition of coercive forces as the main reason for
Arab authoritarianism. However, unlike Brumberg, Brownlee believes that Arab security
forces are completely loyal to the regime. He thinks that rather than looking at the culture
of the Arab regions, theorists should analyze the regime’s coercive apparatus. Brownlee
argues that in the event of an uprising, the security forces would be ready to “deploy
violence against the opponents” at any time (Brownlee 44). Many Middle East states
reveal this oppressive factor, which is linked to low instances of possible regime changes
(Brownlee 44). For example, prior to the Arab Spring, Syria faced an uprising in 1982.
“He [Assad] brutally suppressed his most active opponents, the Muslim Brotherhood,
when they challenged his forces in the city of Hama. Heavy repression ended the
opposition’s effort to change the regime. Since then Syria has seen twenty more years of
continued authoritarianism” (Brownlee 49). Essentially, Arab security forces are more
loyal to the regime than to their nation and citizens.
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Similar to Brownlee, Bellin believes that the endurance of Arab authoritarianism
“lies not in cultural or socioeconomic factors but rather in the character of the Middle
Eastern state and, most importantly, the exceptional strength and will of its coercive
institutions to repress all democratic initiatives” (Authoritarianism 21). Bellin establishes
her argument as a little different from Brownlee’s theory by explaining the Arab regime’s
coercive apparatus and capacity to repress in more depth and adding further factors that
justify the authoritarian capacity (Authoritarianism 21).
Bellin disagrees with arguments related to the insufficiency of prerequisites to
democratize: weak civil society, the state’s control of the economy, poverty, low literacy
levels, geographical location, and Arab culture. Although Bellin agrees that the many
Arab countries lack these various prerequisites, “the MENA [Middle East and North
Africa] region is in no way unique for its poor endowment with the prerequisites of
democracy. Other regions similarly deprived have nonetheless managed to make the
transition” (Authoritarianism 23). For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, civil society is
extremely weak, but a number of the countries have been able to make some democratic
transitions (Authoritarianism 23). Therefore, Bellin argues that the prerequisites of
democracy argument is not sufficient to explain the lack of democratization in the Arab
world, even if a country has combination of all of the factors (Authoritarianism 24).
Rather than looking at prerequisites of democracy, Bellin believes theorists should
look deeper than the inability to achieve the prerequisites because they are not applicable
to just the MENA region. Bellin refers to Theda Skocpol in explaining her argument
behind the real reason for Arab endurance. Bellin writes, “the answer, Skocpol argued,
lies in the strength of the state and, most important, the state’s capacity to maintain a
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monopoly on the means of coercion. If the state’s coercive apparatus remains coherent
and effective, it can face down popular disaffection and survive significant legitimacy”
(Authoritarianism 25). Even though Skocpol explains this idea in regards to revolution,
Bellin argues that it can apply to a democratic transition (Authoritarianism 25).
With Bellin’s reference to Skocpol, she explains that her argument remains within
the threatening capacity and will of Arab states rather than the prerequisites of
democracy. The problem belongs to present conditions that sustain robust
authoritarianism (Authoritarianism 26). “The answer, it argues, lies not in cultural and
social economic factors but rather in the character of the Middle Eastern state and, most
important, the exceptional strength and will of its coercive institutions to repress all
democratic initiatives” (Authoritarianism 21). Arab states are extremely robust due to the
performance of its armed forces, which comes as a result of the funds and mobilization
put into the security forces. “Most [Middle East and North Africa states], moreover,
enjoy sufficient revenue to sustain exceedingly robust expenditure on their security
apparatuses. In fact these expenditures are among the highest in the world. MENA states
are the world leaders in terms of proportion of GNP spent on security” (Authoritarianism
31). Middle East countries, along with North African countries, spend the most on arms
and have an extremely high number of citizens engaged in the security forces. Arab
authoritarian regimes invest exceptional effort into their security apparatuses,
strengthening their forces to fight against any opposition groups (Authoritarianism 31).
Bellin further explains how the coercive capacity of Arab regimes is explained by
four factors. These factors include the states’ rent abundance, support from foreign
countries, the patrimonial nature of the regime, and low levels of popular mobilization for
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change (Authoritarianism 21). “First the robustness of the coercive apparatus is directly
linked to maintenance of fiscal health. The security establishment is most likely to ‘give
up the ghost’ when its financial foundation is seriously compromised” (Authoritarianism
27). Arab authoritarian regimes have even spent more of its GNP on defense than the
global average in the past (Authoritarianism 31). Through rentier income from various
endowments, such as, petroleum or gas resources, Arab authoritarian regimes are able to
build up its security forces by spending more on defense rather than on education and
welfare (Authoritarianism 32).
The second factor, international support, is crucial to the coercive apparatus.
“Withdrawal of international backing triggers both an existential and financial crisis for
the regime that often devastates both its will and capacity to carry on” (Authoritarianism
27). Compared to many other regions, Arab states receive exceptional support from
foreign countries. Even after the end of the Cold War, Arab authoritarian regimes were
still receiving international patronage, as Western countries wanted to assure its oil
sources and the containment of Islamic threat (Authoritarianism 32-33). Bellin argues
patrimonialism and institutionalization as a third factor that shapes the coercive
apparatus. Bellin argues that institutionalization refers to Arab authoritarian states with a
coercive apparatus that “is rule governed, predictable and meritocratic” and “promotion is
based on performance not politics” (Authoritarianism 28). Therefore, institutionalized
security forces are more loyal to the country, rather than the regime. Bellin explains how
most Arab authoritarian states encompass a patrimonial coercive apparatus. With
patrimonialism, “staffing decisions are ruled by cronyism; the distinction between public
and private mission is blurred, leading to widespread corruption and abuse of power”

Berger 23
(Authoritarianism 28). In a patrimonial society, the security forces are more loyal to the
regime, rather than the country itself. Therefore, security forces in Arab authoritarian
states with patrimonialism are more dedicated to the regime and willing to repress. Arab
states with a patrimonial coercive apparatus are more likely to shoot citizens if they were
to rebel against the regime (Authoritarianism 34).
Lastly, in concern to the fourth factor, the level of popular mobilization for
political reform, Bellin believes “the high costs of massive repression will not deter elites
who believe the will be ruined by reform” (Authoritarianism 29). The level of popular
mobilization remains low and therefore Arab countries do not have to put high costs into
repression. “Low levels of popular mobilization for democratic reform are a reality in the
MENA region. They lower the costs of repression for the coercive apparatus and increase
the likelihood that the security establishment will resort to thwart reform initiatives”
(Authoritarianism 35). The low levels of popular mobilization strengthen the coercive
apparatus, as Arab authoritarian regimes are able to spend less of its funds on repression
(Authoritarianism 35). These present conditions “shape the robustness of a regime’s
coercive apparatus” (Authoritarianism 27). Ultimately, Bellin argues the endurance of
Arab authoritarianism lies in the state’s powerful and effective coercive apparatus.
Lastly, Macfarquhar also emphasizes the significance of Arab coercion and
security forces as a significant factor to authoritarianism in the Middle East. Here he
mainly focuses on just the role of secret police in the Middle East (The Media Relations
180). Macfarquhar writes, “secret police agencies, or ‘mukhabarat’ in Arabic, are a
powerful and ubiquitous force in every Middle Eastern country. Any public declaration
even hinting at criticism of the regime inevitably attracts their attention” (The Media
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Relations 181). Arab citizens sometimes explain that the main goal of the secret police is
to spy on the citizenry. They are mainly there to listen, arrest, interrogate, and restrict
activity (The Media Relations 181). For example, the secret police in Jordan, the GID
(General Intelligence Department), requires students to receive a good behavior
document from them if they would like to apply for a certain government program at a
public university (The Media Relations 182). Macfarquhar mainly explains the everyday
actions and goals of the secret police and its ability to keep opposition forces in line
through spying, interrogation, arrests, and restrictions.
Among political, economic, cultural, and security reasons, education plays a role
as an argument. Whitaker believes education is significant because it is a politicized area
under Arab regimes. Children grow up as passive learners because the students are taught
to regurgitate the material and not to question the professor. Whitaker says the result is a
form of detachment, where “there is no real thinking about anything” and therefore the
students become gullible to manipulation (Whitaker 22). In turn, the students are actually
truly manipulated by the government rather than the professor because the authorities
monitor the textbooks and the education system (Whitaker 17). The teaching curriculum
and teaching methods “‘do not permit free dialogue and active, exploratory learning and
consequently do not open the doors to freedom of thought and criticism. On the contrary,
they weaken the capacity to hold opposing viewpoints and to think outside the box. Their
societal role focuses on the reproduction of control in Arab societies’” (Whitaker 19).
The government’s main goal is to instill loyalty, compliance, and support for the regime
in power through education so there are no dissidents, which Whitaker finds to be
particularly successful.
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The endurance of Arab authoritarianism has been a concerning topic among
scholars as many regimes still stand today. Various theorists have argued over the reasons
for the lasting Arab regimes. Some theorists argue more than one reason, completely
oppose others, or support a similar argument. Overall, the most popular reasons are
among political, economic, cultural, security, and educational categories.
The following chapters focus on Jordan and Algeria. These chapters follow fit
with the substance of the literature review, as each regime is an Arab authoritarian state.
Jordan is a monarchy, while Algeria is a republic. Each regime continues to endure today,
and thus supports theories in the literature review. These chapters open up the debate
about the reason as to why Arab authoritarian regimes endure after the Arab Spring.
Through these core chapters, I hope to expand the knowledge of readers in terms of Arab
authoritarianism and the way in which people view the regimes today. Through my
extensive research and analysis, I hope to create increased knowledge in the area of Arab
authoritarianism.
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Chapter 1: Jordan

At the end of 2010, the Arab Spring began in the Middle East. Tunisia was the
first country to be affected by the Arab Spring, but then it spread to other Middle Eastern
countries. In early 2011, protests began in Jordan’s capital and then continued to spread
around the country. Even with the large numbers of protests in Jordan, the monarchy still
continues to last, as King Abdullah II has dealt with the uprisings through religious,
economic, and political strategies.
Jordan’s Regime
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy. King Abdullah
II currently presides as the king of Jordan (Politics and Society 307). “In Jordanian
politics, executive power is invested mainly in the hands of the king, but also in those of
his appointed prime minster and cabinet (the Council of Ministers). The political system
also includes a bicameral legislature, with a royally appointed fifty-five-member upper
house and a popularly elected 110-member lower house” (Politics and Society 313).
According to Jordan’s constitution, the king has the power to appoint the prime minister
and the various members of the cabinet. In 1952, Jordan’s parliament was given more
authority, but the king of Jordan still “retains ultimate authority over the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches” and “executive power is primarily invested in the king”
(Politics and Society 307). The king also has the authority to dismiss the cabinet
members, but the parliament has the power to dismiss the prime minister. Currently, the
king has full power over the government and all of Jordan when parliament is dissolved.
Ryan writes, “the king’s considerable powers include the right to sign and promulgate
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laws, veto legislation, issue royal decrees (with the consent of the prime minister and our
cabinet members), approve amendments to the constitution, command the armed forces,
and declare war. In addition, he appoints and dismisses judges” (Politics and Society
307). The eldest son of King Abdullah will be the next leader of Jordan, as the eldest son
of the royal family assumes the throne (Politics and Society 307). Jordan’s law is based
off of Islamic law, European values, and tradition (Politics and Society 308). Overall,
Jordan’s main power comes from King Abdullah II, but parliament still has considerable
authority, such as the ability to dismiss the prime minister, initiate debates, vote on
legislation, and most recently, the power to elect the prime minister (“Jordan’s
Parliament”).
The backbone of Jordan’s regime is made up of the Hashemite family, the prime
minister, Jordan’s armed forces, and strong supporters of the monarchy. “The 110
members of the lower house are divided among 45 multimember constituencies, all of
which have traditionally been strong supporters of the Hashemite monarchy. These
include six seats for the rural Bedouin, nine seats for the Christian community, and three
sets for the Circassian and Chechen communities” (Politics and Society 313). Lastly,
Jordan is highly supported by western countries, including the United States that supplies
foreign aid to Jordan’s regime (Shaikh)
The main oppositional groups in Jordan are secular, leftists and Islamist activists.
Communists, Baathists, and remaining pan-Arab nationalists are among the secular and
left-leaning activists. The Islamist activists are much more influential and organized in
Jordan compared to the secular leftists. “The Islamist movement in Jordan is mainly in
Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist movement as old as the Hashemite regime
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itself, and the movement’s political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAC)” (Politics and
Society 315). Ultimately, Jordan’s regime faces opposition from two main categories
(Politics and Society 315). Most importantly, “whether rooted in Islam, in pan-Arab
nationalism, or in secular leftist ideas, the political opposition in Jordan has tended to
struggle with the regime over policy and the direction of the state (including demands for
greater democratization), but has not tended to challenge the nature of the state itself as a
Hashemite monarchy” (Politics and Society 317). This concept has been fairly reflective
in the most recent protests in Jordan, starting in the beginning of 2011, mainly organized
by the Muslim Brotherhood (Politics and Society 317).
Jordan’s security forces are made up of three branches. These branches consists of
“the Jordan Arab Army, the Royal Air Force and the Royal Coast Guards” and “Jordan
also has a highly efficient police force, border police and desert patrols who form the
Public Security Force” (“The Armed Forces”). The army is completely volunteer-based,
but eighty-five percent of the army budget is spent on salaries, training, and protection for
the soldiers. “Jordan’s Public Security Force includes approximately 25,000 persons, who
primarily perform police duties. Jordan also has a Civil Defense Brigade, which includes
the Kingdom’s firefighters and ambulance personnel, and an Intelligence Service” (“The
Armed Forced”).
Furthermore, Jordan has an intelligence agency, the General Intelligence Agency
(GID), which is known to be a very effective and a professional organization. The main
purpose of the GID is to “safeguard the security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
domestically and abroad by means of carrying out necessary intelligence operations”
(GID). Even so, the GID is referred to as Jordan’s secret police, also known as the
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Mukhabarat in Arabic. The secret police use systems of surveillance to monitor
opposition groups in Jordan (Aslam). Macfarquhar writes, “those seeking democratic
reform say the central role of each country's secret police force, with its stealthy, octopuslike reach, is one of the biggest impediments to democratic change. In the decades since
World War II, as military leaders and monarchs smothered democratic life, the security
agencies have become a law unto themselves” (“Smothering Democracy”).
Protests in Jordan
After the Arab Spring began in Tunisia and Egypt, Jordan experienced its first
major protest on January 14, 2011 in front of the Al Omari mosque in Karak. The protest,
organized by a small leftist group and Baathist parties, began over the issue of food
prices, but the demonstrators were mainly enraged with overall economic conditions and
Samir Rifai’s government. One of the protesters, Taqfiq al-Batoush, explains, “we are
protesting the policies of the government – high prices and repeated taxation that made
the Jordanian people revolt” (“Hundreds Protest”) A few days before the protest, the
Jordanian government announced its commitment to cut food and fuel prices, but this was
not sufficient for the citizens, as they did not consider the reforms to be significant
enough and suspected they would most likely be temporary (“Hundreds Protests”)
Only about 400 people made it to the protest in Karak, but another 200 people
showed up to a protest in Dhiban. Another demonstrator, Khaled al-Majali, explained,
“we are calling for the departure of Samir Rifai's government and a government of
national unity, not a government of Amman corporations” (“Hundreds Protest”).
Ultimately, Jordanians were inspired by the Arab Spring and used this time to rebel
against high prices, taxes, lack of job creation in a public sector for tribesmen, and the
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general economic conditions that they believed were leading to poverty (“Hundreds
Protest”).
A little over a week later, Jordanian citizens gathered for another protest
organized by the dominant Islamist opposition group in Jordan, the Islamic Action Front,
which is also the Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm. The protests were similar to the
first one, as the demonstrators called for the same reforms and the resignation of Jordan’s
Prime Minister, Samir Rifai, except this time over 3,000 activists showed up in Amman.
They also demanded an end to corruption, inflation, and increasing prices. An extra two
2,500 people also protested in several other cities in Jordan (“Jordanian Protesters
Demand”).
Jordan’s king decided to appoint a new Prime Minister, Marouf al-Bakhit, for the
second time. Kadri and Bronner write, “changing cabinets is not new for King Abdullah.
In his 12 years on the throne, he has done so eight times. But this was the first time that
he had done so in reaction to public pressure, seeking to undermine a growing protest
movement across a broad spectrum of society to pre-empt further unrest” (“King of
Jordan”). Jordanians were still unhappy and formed another protest on February 2nd,
2011. This was a much smaller protest, compared to the protests prior to it, and only
mainly involved the Islamic Action Front and leftist groups. This protest called for
political reforms, an end to government corruption, and even the resignation of the new
prime minister (Maktabi). The activists were unhappy with the lack of democracy in
Jordan, as King Abudullah only responded by appointing a past prime minister to
reshuffle the government. Therefore, the activists demanded reforms during their
demonstrations, such as an elected prime minister (“Jordan Islamists”).
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The protests in Jordan continued on February 18, 2011. The protests were held in
Amman at the Al-Husseini mosque, where for the first time activists were injured during
a peaceful demonstration. There were only about 300 protesters demanding political
reform, but about eight of them were injured after clashing with a pro-government group
carrying sticks and metal batons. Muwafak Mahadeen, a newspaper columnist and
demonstrator, claims, “‘we were not calling for the downfall of the regime but for an
elected government, democratic laws, opening the corruption files and against the peace
agreement with Israel’” (Greenberg). Mahadeen believes that the government supporters
were most likely deployed by the government’s forces, as the police did not even attempt
to mediate the situation (Greenberg).
The following Friday, Jordan experienced its largest protests thus far. About
8,000 protesters rallied in the streets of Amman for a pro democracy demonstration,
calling it the “Day of Anger.” All of the protesters, alongside the Islamic Action Front,
had different grievances, but ultimately “demonstrators want[ed] greater political say and
economic change at home” after learning about the power of the Tunisian and Egyptian
uprising (“Middle East Protests”). Most of the Jordanian activists showed up as a
backlash to the violence that had occurred in the protest the previous Friday (“Thousands
Rally”). The protestors did not want a regime change, but rather reforms and more rights
(“Middle East Protests”).
On March 24, 2011, a group labeled, the “March 24th” Movement,” set up a camp
with tents in the heart of Amman. Over 1,000 protesters showed up for the tent camp,
modeling themselves after Tahir Square protest in Cairo. The idea was similar to one of a
“sit in,” as they claimed they would not move from their tents until real reforms were put
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into place. A number of the protesters were young students who learned about the protest
through Internet sources, such as Facebook. One of the protesters, Abdullah Habiba, a
twenty-two-year old student, explained “‘this is my first demonstration, and I heard about
it on Facebook” and “I study political science in the university. I want the parliament
dissolved and new elections. Now this is the only way forward’” (“Jordan Protesters Set
Up)”. The protesters were looking for tangible reforms, such as economic equality and an
end to corruption (“Jordan Protesters Set Up”).
A day later the protesters clashed once again with government supporters in
Amman. This time one demonstrator died and 130 were injured. Rather than acting as
bystanders, the police stepped in this time with the use of water cannons to halt the
fighting. Even so, there were reports commenting on misbehavior by the government
security forces. One of the protesters claimed “‘the [pro-monarchy] thugs were throwing
stones from one side and police were attacking protesters with sticks to push them
back,’” and a Reuters cameraman explained how he was tackled by government
supporters and Jordanian police (“Protests in Jordan Turn”). Many Jordanians are huge
supporters of the government and refused to watch protesters attempt to make changes
that could lead to a possible regime change (“Protests in Jordan Turn”).
A third clash between the protesters and government supporters broke out on
April 1st, 2011. Over 1,000 officers were mobilized in Amman to make sure violence did
not erupt during the time. The demonstrators were mainly looking for a constitutional
change and the dissolution of parliament. In response, the government supporters, also
known as government loyalists, were holding pictures of the King and shouting out
slogans, such as “long live the king” (Jiang).
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The clash continued on April 15th, 2011 when extreme Islamists had an altercation
with government supporters in Zarqa. Halaby writes, “a crowd of about 350 extremist
Salafi Muslims faced off with a slightly smaller group of pro-king loyalists in the town of
Zarqa. Salafis beat the government supporters with clubs and fists, and the two sides
hurled stones at each other, leaving people bloodied on the ground” (Wong). Rather than
the usual leftists and moderate Islamist groups, the Salafi movement led the protest. The
Salafi movement is ultra-conservative, and banned in Jordan. The altercation began after
the Salafi group spoke in front of the Omar ibn Khattab mosque, attacking Jordan’s
alliance with the United States. The Salafi group also called for Islamic Shariah law to
rule Jordan, rather than the typical protesters calling for political and economic reforms.
Dozens of people ended up injured in the clash, including a couple in critical condition
(Wong).
On the same day of the Salafi movement protest, over 1,000 protesters
demonstrated in Amman. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front put the
demonstration together. This group of protesters was demanding similar reforms from the
past fourteen weeks and the dissolution of the cabinet. The protest escalated between the
Islamists and government supporters, thus turning the protest into a violent event.
“Jordanian police used tear gas at Islamist protesters Friday after six officers were
stabbed and seriously injured” and “forty policemen were injured, including six stabbed,
as they tried to disperse a demonstration by Islamist Salafists in Zarqa” (Albawaba) The
heightened violence occurred after Salafists had attacked some innocent citizens
(Albawaba).
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The protests died down until June of 2011. On June 13, 2011, King Abdullah II
visited a tribal town in Jordan, Tafileh. The youth protesters had demonstrated against
government corruption prior to his visit. The youth activists were denied a request to
meet the king, and subsequently responded with an outbreak of violence. As a result,
about thirty police officers were injured and the rioters burned several cars (Kadri). In
July, the protests subsided and transformed back into a peaceful setting.
On July 29, 2011, around 3,000 people attended a protest in Amman. One of the
protesters, a member of the Constitutional Monarchy Movement, explained how the
protest revealed how the movement is growing quickly in the northern area, referring to
Irbid, Jerash, and Ajlun. Solovieva explains “protesters at the rally said the United States
was inconsistent in its policy in the region and was ultimately causing more harm than
good – it’s an old refrain, but one that has become more apparent since the Arab Spring
sprung in January” (Solovieva). A lot of the protesters pointed their anger at the United
States, as the United States started out as government supporters and slowly started
allying with the rebels in different areas (Solovieva).
The seventh clash in 2011 between the protesters and the government supporters
occurred on August 14, 2011. A government reform committee was set to present its
constitutional reforms to the king, but the activists were unsatisfied with the proposed
changes. There were forty-two proposed changes, which included “limiting the
jurisdiction of military courts to only terrorism and espionage cases,” leaving out
financial and corruption cases (“Proposed Changes”). The proposed changes also
consisted of marginally expanding the powers of the elected parliament. The protesters
were looking for change to increase the parliament’s power, but “the proposed changes to
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the nearly 60-year-old constitution would still allow Jordan's monarch to retain most of
his absolute powers” (“Proposed Reforms”). The reforms did not even cover the
protesters’ concerns regarding an election for the prime minister. The clash did not
produce as many injuries as the previous ones, but four people were still hurt in the
altercation (“Proposed Reforms”).
In September of 2011, the protests died down for the most part, except for a few
in regards to Israel. As a result of an anti-Israel demonstration, the staff at the Israeli
embassy in Jordan was sent home. The group of activists “called for a ‘million-man
march’ against the Israeli mission, part of a rising tide of anti-Israel protests in Jordan and
in Egypt, the two Arab countries that have made peace with the Jewish state” (“Israel
Evacuates”) Jordanian leftists, Islamists, and labor groups mobilized the protests looking
for an end to the 1994 peace treaty held with Israel and the removal of the Israeli
ambassador (“Israel Evacuates”).
At the end of September, over 4,000 Jordanians protested in Amman in response
to a bill that was passed in the lower house that made corruption accusations without
proof a crime. The protesters explained how they were enraged because “a government
that is protecting corruption cannot be trusted, and a parliament of corruption does not
represent the people” (Palazzolo). At the same time, the activists were provoked by King
Abdullah II’s support for constitutional changes that formed an independent commission.
The independent commission would be allowed to administer elections and restrain the
authority of the military state security court. These constitutional changes were unpopular
among Jordanians, as the military state security court would only be allowed to deal with
“cases of high treason, espionage and terrorism,” leaving out corruption (Palazzolo).
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Jordanians viewed these changes as a way to protect government corruption. Most
importantly, the Jordanians were upset with the king’s failure to amend the constitution in
allowing an elected prime minister (Palazzolo).
The protests reemerged on October 7, 2011 in Amman. Over 3,000 people
attended the demonstration, which turned out as an anti-corruption march starting from
the Al-Hussein mosque and ending at the town hall. Islamists and leftists led this
demonstration, labeling themselves as The National Reform Front (NRF), which is the
first time they mobilized a group as a partnership. “The demonstrators carried banners
reading: ‘Political reform is the path to wiping out corruption…Corruption is the cause of
poverty and unemployment’” (“Thousands Protest”). Whether in the form of political or
financial corruption, the activists were looking to end it altogether (“Thousands Protest”).
A few days later, on October 15, 2011, the global “Occupy” movement hit Jordan
in the city of Salhub. Outside the conference, “For Reforms and against Corruption,” pro
government loyalists once again clashed with the peaceful protesters. The altercation
became very violent when some of the loyalists threw stones at the protesters and even
shot their guns into free space in hopes of breaking up the demonstration. “The event was
organized to demand the resignation of Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit’s government and
the dissolution of parliament for failing to carry out necessary political reform, the
organizers of the gathering said” (“Pro-Regime”). Unfortunately, as a result of the clash,
thirty-five people were hurt and twenty-seven cars were destroyed (“Pro-Regime”).
Throughout November and December a number of riots and protests took place
throughout various cities in Jordan, including tribal towns. For example, on December
24, 2011, activists engaged in a demonstration called “Friday to return lands.” Luck
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writes, “activists claim ongoing corruption, privatization and the failure of the
government to follow through on pledges to study various demands of return of wajihatstate-owned lands, that were registered in the names of various tribes during the Ottoman
era, are driving this Friday’s [December 24, 2011] protests” (Luck). The activists also
protested in front of the office of the prime minister in response to the mistreatment of the
demonstrators by the police previously in Mafraq. The Jordanian citizens were infuriated
with the fact that the Jordanian police used tear gas to end an altercation between the
protesters and the government loyalists (“Jordan Opposition”).
Until September of 2012, the protests subsided immensely. On September 1,
2012, Jordanian citizens took to the streets again in the city of Amman. Similar to
protests in the past, the activists were unhappy with the way King Abdullah II had
reshuffled the cabinet and thus demanded that Jordan’s Prime Minister, Fayez Tarawneh,
step down. Alongside the grievances about the prime minister, the Jordanian citizens
were protesting about high fuel prices. The Muslim Brotherhood organized the protest
and it was Jordan’s first big protest of 2012 (“Jordanian Protesters Stage Rallies”).
A week later a clash occurred between the anti-riot forces and the protesters, yet
again. The protesters started a demonstration in the city of Tafileh and started rallying
against King Abdullah II. One of the present activists, Fadi Abadeen, claimed, “as soon
as we started using the words ‘royal palace’ and ‘regime,’ the police came at us with
force, ” and the Jordanian security forces reportedly fired tear gas to break up the riot
(“Clashes, Arrests”). The activists had the same goal of the first protest: demand that
Prime Minister Fayez Tarawneh resign for his outrageous attempt to increase fuel prices.
“Unlike neighboring countries, Jordan’s protest movement has long called for ‘regime
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reform’ rather than ‘regime change,’ urging for a transfer of King Abdullah’s
constitutional authority to form governments to the people” (“Clashes, Arrests”).
Throughout the month of November in 2012, a series of major protests occurred
across Jordan as a result of the increase in fuel prices. The first significant riot took place
on November 13, 2012. During this riot, the protesters destroyed traffic lights and tires
with fire, while the police tried to break up the chaos with tear gas and open fire.
Demonstrators even set pictures of King Abdullah II on fire. “In Amman, thousands of
demonstrators filled the circle outside the Interior Ministry near midnight, chanting, ‘The
people want the fall of the regime,’” which is the first time the Jordanian citizens called
for a regime change during their protests (Rudoren). Even a member of the Muslim
Brotherhood commented how the tension in Jordan was at its peak. Rudoren writes, “the
eruption comes as King Abdullah has struggled to contain a growing and increasingly
diverse opposition by introducing electoral reforms ahead of balloting scheduled for
January and by establishing a constitutional court” (Rudoren). Essentially, the increase in
gas prices sparked the November riots and protests, but Jordanian citizens were
ultimately upset with the overall political and economic conditions that have remained
stagnant (Rudoren).
The “November Gust” protests continued until the 18th. These protests
encompassed major riots with chants to take down the monarchy, even when the United
States expressed its support for King Abdullah II. First-time protesters and supporters of
the government even showed up to some of the demonstrations. For example, “in this
affluent northern city [Irbid], usually a bulwark of support for the king, some
demonstrators spoke openly of demands for democracy” (Kirkpatrick). One of the
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protesters even expressed how the demonstrations have not just been about the rising
prices of fuel. The activists were also concerned with democracy, corruption, and
freedom (Kirkpatrick). The protests reached its peak on Friday, November 16, 2012 when
the activists chanted, “‘Qaddafi, Ben Ali and Mubarak all left,’ referring to the former
leaders of Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. “Abdullah, go, go” (Kirkpatrick). Out of thousands
of people, 130 protesters were arrested for calling for an end to the monarchy. The
November protests were violent and chaotic, but it sincerely spoke for the people (Jordan
Islamists).
Recently, in January of 2013, a number of protests have occurred leading up to
parliamentiary elections in Jordan. On January 18, 2013, thousands gathered in Amman
to protest the upcoming elections. Most of the protesters were among youth activists and
the Muslim Brotherhood. “The Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan's largest opposition
group, has renewed calls for King Abdullah to transfer his authority to appoint
governments to the ‘people’, meaning an elected parliament” (“Thousands Call”). The
protesters demanded reforms and more power for the people, as they were not fooled by
the cosmetic elections with vote buying and election fraud. Protests were also taking
place in Karak and Maan, where the activists were also boycotting the elections. “Prodemocracy activists have called for constitutional reform that would transfer the
monarch's authority, to appoint and dismiss governments, to parliament” (“Thousands
Call”). With the upcoming election, the Jordanian citizens felt the need to protest as a
way to facilitate actual reforms in Jordan (“Thousands Call”).
Jordan’s Response
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The analysis of Jordan’s protests from 2011 to 2013 point to a regime change, but
Jordan’s monarchy continues to endure until this day. The government has responded to
the protests in various ways over the past few years to ensure a lasting regime under King
Abdullah II. The first response occurred on February 1, 2011, when King Abdullah II
reshuffled his government. His first step was to fire Prime Minister Samir Rifai and
replace him with Marouf al-Bakhit. Al-Bakhit had served in the past under King Abullah
II, but the king considered him to be a good choice, as he was seen to be clean of
corruption (“King of Jordan”)
King Abdullah has reshuffled his government before, but this was the first time he
had made this action in response to anti-government protests. Kadri and Bronner write,
“the palace statement said Mr. Bakhit would have the task of ‘taking practical, swift and
tangible steps to launch a real political reform process, in line with the king’s version of
comprehensive reform, modernization and development.’” King Abdullah II also thought
Mr. Bakhit was a good alternative to Rifai because trade unions and the Muslim
Brotherhood were upset with the prime minister’s focus on technocrats and businesses,
rather than focusing on the citizens’ concerns. Although many Jordanians were still
unhappy with this choice, “some protest leaders were cautiously positive. Nahed Hattar, a
leftist activist, said in a telephone interview that he considered the change a good move
but that he wanted to see the government program before rendering judgment” (“King of
Jordan”). King Abdullah II also promised the inclusion of the Islamic Action Front and
Islamists into the new government. He kept this promise and on February 10, 2011, one
Islamist and a total of five leftists were sworn into the new Jordanian cabinet (“Middle
East Protests”)
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To follow up with the government change, the government created a 225 million
dollar reduction package in fuel prices and staples, specifically sugar and rice. The prime
minister also increased wages for civil servants and the army (“Thousands Call”). With
these government changes, King Abdullah II called for immediate changes of the laws
regarding politics and civil freedoms (Wong). “Reform initiatives included convening a
national dialogue committee in March, and appointing a royal committee to revise the
constitution in April. The committees proposed modest reforms to the electoral system,
and significant reforms to the constitution, though they left out guarantees for gender
equality” (“World Report 2012”).
King Abdullah created the first tangible law reform on February 15, 2011 when
he revised the Public Gatherings Law. The reform allows citizens to mobilize civil
demonstrations or meetings without the permission of the government. The Public
Gatherings Law still requires Jordanian citizens to notify authorities of any demonstration
or meeting two days prior to the event and they must abide by public order. The
government claimed that it would not interfere in any protest or meeting, but security
forces would still need to guarantee public safety. Halaby writes, “about 3,000 tribal
leaders and key figures—including lawmakers, retired security personnel and
academicians – renewed their allegiance to the king in an emotional letter, praising his
reform efforts,” which reveals King Abdullah made a step in the right direction in order
to ensure the safety of his monarchy (Schwartz).
In March of 2011, the “National Dialogue Committee” (NDC) was officially
created to reform electoral laws and political parties. Jordanian citizens have long been
upset with the electoral law formed in 1993, which only allows for one vote, therefore
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limiting the influence of Islamist and leftist groups in parliament. “The NDC-proposed
electoral law provides for a two-tier system, with 115 deputies elected at the district level
and 15 seats reserved for national lists. SNTV [1993 electoral law] is scrapped for an
open proportional list system, which will give a boost to opposition parties and
particularly the IAF” (“How Stable”). The new electoral law still presents an issue for
rural and tribal regions because it does not address the problem of gerrymandering. Often
times, “rural and tribal areas are given disproportionate weight at the expense of
predominantly Palestinian cities like Amman and Zarqa” (“How Stable”).
On March 28, 2011, shortly after the first clash between government supporters
and protesters, King Abdullah II called for a national unity day. The king stated, "what
matters to us in this stage is that our national unity must not be undermined" and "we are
proceeding in earnest with the political reform process and we have nothing to fear”
(CNN). He expressed optimistic thoughts for a bright future in Jordan with the various
economic and developmental programs they were working on, such as projects on health
and education that are compatible for the Petra district. For example, “the premier, who
reviewed the government’s achievements and plans in different fields, said the
government is working on electronically linking Queen Rania Hospital in the district with
Prince Hamzah Hospital to promote telemedicine” (Ghazal). With the various injuries in
the altercation at the protest, King Abdullah II touched upon the need to refrain from
violent actions that could harm national unity. The king ended his speech with his
promises for economic and political reform (Ghazal).
Later on, in June of 2011, King Abdullah II spoke about his promise to reform the
election process, where the cabinets will be created based on the majority of an elected
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parliament. The king did not specify when exactly he would give up his appointment
powers, but this was “the first time he has made such a concession publicly to his
citizens, and follows six months of protests” (“Jordan’s King Abdullah”). Most
Jordanians claimed that the king did not give a permanent date as to when he would make
this reform because he wanted to see a change in the political parties, specifically the
merging of thirty-three political parties into three distinct parties. Other than the king’s
unexpected vow for elected cabinets, he claimed that he would be revising more laws in
regard to the election and political parties to quell Jordanians’ grievances (“Jordan’s King
Abdullah”).
In August of 2011, King Abdullah II appointed a committee to propose
constitutional amendments. These amendments included the creation of a constitutional
court, an independent commission for elections, the improvement of civil liberties, the
restraint of the State Security Court, the restriction of temporary laws without parliament,
and the government limitation to dissolve parliament. All of these proposed amendments
had various purposes to develop Jordan. For example, the constitutional court was
proposed, “to monitor the constitutionality of laws and regulations. The court replaces a
high tribunal for the interpretation of such laws that was headed by the speaker of the
Senate and widely considered less than totally independent” and the independent
commission was proposed to “oversee elections instead of the Ministry of Interior that
has previously been in charge of the electoral process. All electoral contestations will be
referred to the judiciary instead of parliament” (Muasher 1). The enhancement of civil
liberties was proposed as an amendment to criminalize rights and public freedom
violations, as well as torture in all forms. The committee suggested restraining the State

Berger 44
Security Court’s “jurisdiction to cases of high treason, espionage, and terrorism, with
citizens being otherwise tried in civilian courts; this includes ministers, who were
previously tried by a parliamentary high tribunal” (Muasher 1). Finally, the committee
proposed to limit the government capability of issuing temporary laws without parliament
and dissolving parliament because Jordan’s king frequently abused this power in the past
(Muasher 1).
Jordan’s constitution was officially amended in May and October of 2012, but
only the establishment of an independent election commission and a constitutional court
and was passed from the proposed list (Muasher 2). The Independent Election
Commission was created in May of 2012. King Abdullah II announced, “we rely on this
commission to usher in a new era in Jordan’s political history, an era characterised with
balance between the branches of government and steady improvement in the performance
of Parliament and political parties” (“Creation of Independent”). He also explained how
the main purpose of the Independent Election Commission was to supervise and run all
parts of elections with regards to international standards (“Creation of Independent”).
The constitutional court was amended in October and issued to replace the Higher
Council for the Interpretation of the Constitution (HCIC). The king considered the
establishment of a constitutional court to be a national achievement. “Article 59 of the
Constitution states that “the Constitutional Court shall monitor the constitutionality of
laws and regulations in force and issue its judgments in the name of the King” and “the
Constitutional Court “has the right to interpret the provisions of the Constitution if
requested, either by virtue of a decision of the Council of Ministers or by a resolution
taken by the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies passed by an absolute majority” (JT).

Berger 45
Furthermore, King Abdullah II explained how the Constitutional Court would balance the
branches of government (JT).
On October 17, 2011, Jordan’s Prime Minister, Marouf Al-Bakhit, officialy
resigned after the majority of parliamentarians requested for the end of his reign. Aside
from pressure from Jordanian citizens, the parliamentarians believed that Al-Bakhit was
unable to stabilize dialogue with the opposition groups, such as the Islamists and the
leftist groups. The king replaced Marouf Al-Bakhit with Awn al-Khasawneh, a widely
known judge of the Hague-based International Court of Justice. This appointment
“reinforces Abdullah's stated intentions of instituting reforms. The measures could
include decentralization, fighting corruption, giving more independence to parliament
and inviting the opposition into the government” (“Jordan’s Marouf”).
Abdullah was pleased with his choice for the new prime minister because alKhasawneh is an older liberal and had a good relationship with opposition groups,
specifically the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition, al-Khasawneh had a clean record when
Abdullah II appointed him. “Abdullah told al-Khasawneh to launch an ‘effective and
constructive dialogue with all political groups,’ according to a designation letter obtained
from the Royal Palace” (“Jordan’s Marouf”). The king also demanded that the new prime
minster focus on revising the parliamentary election law, where the Islamist opposition
group would not be undermined with a disproportionate number of seats. Normally the
king does not follow through with legal reforms, but the announcement was a significant
response to the citizens. Furthermore, the king called for a resolution to the corruption
problem in government, as well as an independent council that could administer the
parliamentary elections in 2013. Lastly, Abdullah II replaced Jordan’s intelligence chief,
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Mohammed Raqqad, with Faisal Shobaki after various complaints were made about
Raqqad’s intimidation methods. This was a huge step for Jordan’s monarchy in
attempting to reform the government, which has helped keep the regime alive (“Jordan’s
Marouf”).
Awn al-Khasawneh did not last very long under Jordan’s regime. In April of
2012, Al-Khasawneh resigned from office due to failed reforms. Jordanian citizens were
unhappy with the lack of improvements in Jordan, as well as “proposed electoral reforms
in the western-backed kingdom that were seen by critics as an assault on civil liberties”
(Black). The proposed election law was drafted for the purposes of limiting the amount of
seats opposition groups would be able to sustain in parliament, such as the Islamic Action
Front. King Abdullah II was accused of reshuffling his cabinet just to keep the rebellions
under control. Even so, King Abdullah II replaced al-Khasawneh with a former prime
minister from the 1990s, Fayez al-Tarawneh. "The king has shuffled cabinets and then
shuffled them again, using prime ministers as buffers to absorb popular discontent” and
he has charged committees to explore possible reforms, but these remain largely
unimplemented” (Black). Regardless, even with the past uprisings in Jordan since 2011,
King Abdullah II’s monarchy seems fairly stable and most of the protests have called for
reforms rather than a regime change (Boghani).
In October of 2012, King Abdullah II dissolved his parliament and announced his
plans for early elections (Boghani). Abdullah Ensour was chosen as the new prime
minister of Jordan to create a new government (Khadder). The king did not provide an
exact date for early elections, but he planned on organizing the polls before 2013. He
made this announcement after he vowed to implement new political laws and revise old
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ones, as a way to deal with the anti-government protests. “Abdullah II said recently that
the new parliament will elect a prime minister next year, instead of following the
country's tradition until now of the king appointing the premier” (Boghani). This
sentiment has helped quell the protests and a call for a regime change, even though
Jordanians have heard the king make this statement in the past. Many groups still planned
on performing peaceful demonstrations after the king had made a call for a new
government, but they were still optimistic that the king could help build a brighter future
for Jordan. For example, Nimer Assaf, a leader of the Islamic Action Front, explained,
“we do not look for names, we look for the deeds, and we hope that this next government
will go ahead with reforms which the Jordanians have been asking for a very long time”
(Khadder). Overall, the king’s attempt at reforms has left Jordanians with an optimistic
outlook for the monarchy.
King Abdullah II did not end up holding elections before the end of 2012, but
recently, in January of 2013, the king has made attempts to deal with reforms for the
parliamentary elections on January 23, 2013. On January 9, 2013, the king called a
meeting to deal with election corruption. The meeting was held specifically in concern to
vote buying and a number of other election crimes. King Abdullah II met with the
Independent Elections Commission to deal with the problems at hand and he explained
Jordan’s national duty to tackle the issue of political money. The king explained how he
wanted the Independent Elections Commission to take full measures in guaranteeing fair
and neutral elections with transparency. In order to reach this goal, the king demanded
the supervision of local and international groups over elections. “During the meeting, IEC
President Abdul Ilah Khatib noted that the monitoring body, which was established under
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a Royal Decree and a constitutional provision, has been working to build a reputation as a
highly professional and neutral entity that employs the best international practices in
election management” (“King Calls”). The monarch and the Independent Elections
Commission claimed to have worked hard in the meeting to ensure that Jordan begins
2013 with a new political life era (“King Calls)
To further ensure Jordan’s goal of fair elections, “the board has endorsed a
number of executive instructions regulating the election stages from registration to ballot
sorting to announcing the results” (“King Calls”). The board of commissioners will then
provide the king with an elections report on the Independent Elections Commissions’
ability to hold elections. The detailed report will also provide the board’s improvement
suggestions for future elections and laws. The local and international agencies also
provided voters with election information in concern to the polls and process, in order to
improve the pace and organization of elections. Lastly, the Independent Elections
Commission created a training program for the commission’s staff. “The IEC has been
open to all sectors of society and is keen on building a fruitful partnership with all
stakeholders that would enhance people’s confidence in the commission and the steps it
takes to protect voters’ right to free choice” (“King Calls”). The monarchy and the
Independent Election Commission may not have been sincere in its reforms, but
nonetheless pledged to ensure free and proper elections for Jordanian citizens to keep the
regime stable (“King Calls”).
King Abdullah II made a following announcement on January 17th regarding the
fairness of elections. He explained the outline for a transparent and democratic transition.
He claimed, “the new prime minister after next Wednesday’s elections will be designated
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based on consultations with the majority coalition of parliamentary blocs. If no clear
majority emerges in the next Lower House, the designation will be ‘based upon
consultation with all parliamentary blocs’” (“Making Our”). King Abdullah II expressed
his optimism for the upcoming election and his willingness to reform the process for the
next election after observing any mistakes the new system might have. He considered this
to be a huge step towards democracy and a parliamentary government, even though these
were most likely announcements to quell protesters (“Making Our”).
Lastly, the king set three conditions to guarantee an effective parliamentary
government. These three conditions included “‘true national parties that aggregate
specific and local interests into a national platform for action,’” “the kingdom’s civil
service should ‘further develop its professional, impartial non-political abilities to support
and advice,’” and “‘a change in parliamentary conventions’” (“Making Our”). In concern
to the change in parliamentary conventions, King Abdullah II explained how these
reforms would change how parliament works and support a full parliamentary
government. The formation of Governments will ultimately be guided by parliamentary
bloc consultations, where they will discuss common policy platforms. “Opposition parties
will similarly need to agree on conventions for how they cooperate in holding the
Government to account and offer an alternate vision – their role is just as crucial for
successful Government” (Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein). King Abdullah II claimed that he
believed these conditions would ensure a supportive parliament that communicates well
with him (“Making Our”)
On January 18, 2013, the king held another meeting to discuss reforms and
election process. The king met with public figures, such as Islamist leaders, the previous
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chief and minister of the Royal Court, and Adnan Bakhit, as well as many other top
politicians. “On political reform, he [King Abudullah II] stressed the importance of
working with parliamentary blocs after the January 23 elections, adding that the coming
stage, which will witness the emergence of parliamentary governments, will be very vital
in Jordan’s political history” (“Middle East and North Africa”). The meeting also
addressed various developments and projects across Jordan, such as ones to improve
energy conservation. The king took various concerns among the attendees into
consideration, such as social equality and government trust. The meeting was viewed as a
step towards Jordan’s progress and reforms (“Middle East and North Africa”). Aside
from the meeting, the king published a couple of political treatises to facilitate public
debate and motivate Jordanian citizens to vote in the elections (“Elections, Parliament”).
Prior to parliamentary elections, Jordan’s regime passed a new electoral law. The
new law established a two-ballot vote. With the two-ballot vote, voters are able to vote
twice: “one for representatives from local districts and one for candidates competing
under a proportional representation at the national level” (Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood).
Opposition groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, were not pleased with this reform
because “an increase of seats allocated for party candidates in the 140-strong lower house
of parliament – from 17 to 27- is not enough” (Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood). Also, the
Muslim Brotherhood claimed that the new law would favor tribal candidates in the local
district (Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood). Overall, opposition groups were disappointed
with the new electoral law and considered it to be an enhancement for the king, rather
than the people.

Berger 51
Jordan’s parliamentary elections were officially held on January 23, 2013. Once
again, government supporters, also known as loyalists, won the majority of seats in
Jordan’s parliament. The Islamic Action Front boycotted the elections, as it was
unsatisfied with the election rules and vote buying. Even so, Islamists and leftists still
won seats and “international observers who monitored the elections noted improvements
over previous votes” (Fahim). The National Democratic Institute provided fifty members
to observe the voting process and ensure safety from election corruption. Many Jordanian
citizens were still upset with the outcome of the election and vowed to continue
protesting, but Jordan’s regime still continues to endure with King Abdullah II (Fahim).
Most recently, on March 9, 2013, Jordan’s parliament was given the ability to
choose the prime minister for “the first time in the country’s history that the legislature
rather than the king has decided who will be head of government” (Jordan’s Parliament).
Abdullah Ensour, previously a liberal lawmaker, was elected as the new prime minister
of Jordan by parliament. King Abdullah II claimed that he would allow Ensour to remain
in office for the next four years. “King Abdullah II formally confirmed Ensour's
appointment. Abdullah has in the past selected prime ministers, but he relinquished that
right as part of the reform package announced last year” (“Jordan’s Parliament”).
Theories
To this day, scholars debate the reasons as to why Jordan’s regime still stands
even after the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring did not hit Jordan in the same way as
countries like Tunisia and Egypt. Jordan has seen a rise in protests over the last few years
after the Arab Spring occurred, but the monarchy still continues to endure. Most of these
arguments fall under the topic of religious, economical, political, and social reasons.
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When looking at religious reasons, some theorists point to the idea of traditional
legitimacy. Burger explains how Jordan’s monarchy has been extremely stable. He
revealed much of its strength over the past three decades. Most of the protesters did not
even try to take down Jordan’s monarchy. Rather the majority of the protests in Jordan
called for reforms instead of a regime change (Burger 7). Burger reveals how Jordan’s
monarchy still stands after the Arab Spring because the citizens believe in the
monarchy’s legitimacy, as the regime is rooted in early history. “Tracing back their
origins through Islamic lineage to Prophet Mohammad provides the Hashemites with an
incontestable source of legitimacy and gives them quasi-religious authority rendering
criticism against them equal to blasphemy” (Burger 8). Jordan’s monarchy itself uses this
role to upgrade the regime and ensure its stability. For example, Jordan’s monarchy will
highlight its position in the 1916 Great Arab Revolt, where the great-great-grandfather of
King Abdullah II, Sharif Al-Hussein bin Ali, organized the revolt against the Ottomans.
“This strategy was successful: blogger and activist Naseem Tarawnah states that ‘loyalty
to the king is seen as loyalty to the country. They are intertwined and people sometimes
have difficulty separating the two’” (Burger 8).
Even opposition groups, such as the Islamic Action Front, believe it has a
religious duty to maintain the Jordanian monarchy (Burger 8). This strategy was proven
extremely successful during the protests when King Abdullah II held various celebrations
for Jordan, such as Jordan’s 65th anniversary of independence, Army Day, and the Great
Arab Revolt anniversary. “According to reports, this mass event ‘voiced support for
progress in the country and reiterated loyalty to Jordan under the leadership of His
Majesty the King” (Burger 15). Also, the king visited tribal areas to secure his support
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through royal favors, such as makrama. Makrama has a historical meaning behind it that
symbolizes a gift, which is rooted in traditional legitimacy. This was proven to be a
success when the king did not meet many protests in Tafileh (Burger 16). Horres agrees
with Burger and argues protesters were only looking for reforms within the regime due to
the royal family’s monopoly on power through the legitimacy of the monarchy (Horres
141). Overall, Jordan’s monarchy is deeply rooted in history, preserving its stability
through legitimacy (Burger 8).
Aside from religious reasons, economic arguments have been debated among
theorists as to why the Jordan monarchy still remains intact. One argument includes the
creation of jobs, mainly in the public sector, and the flow of aid to the population (Burger
8). Horres explains how foreign aid in Jordan serves as a “lubricant to ease political
tensions” (Horres 155). She also argues that foreign aid has been helpful, but it has only
been working with the use of political reforms as well, in order to satisfy the protesters,
which makes Jordan’s monarchy distinct from Bahrain’s monarchy (Horres 155). Jordan
relies on the influx of foreign aid to the population in order to keep the regime stable, as
the country is unable to rely on its limited resources within the country. This political
strategy has become known as a “top down” allocation with the use of foreign aid. Jordan
has created economic liberalization programs over the years, but the king has never
privatized state entities. Burger explains, “full privatization would have led to the
dismissal of workers from previously state-owned enterprises; this would have
jeopardized peoples’ acceptance of the rulers and was thus avoided.” Overall Burger
believes Jordanian citizens have been essentially bought off to keep them from
overturning the regime (Burger 8).
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Similar to this approach, Ritcher explains how Jordan relies on material resources,
such as phosphate and potash exports to remain stable. Rather than just buying off the
population, Ritcher portrays how the material resources are allocated to a defense and
security budget, as well as public wages and pensions. In times of fiscal scarcity, the
material distribution has supported the endurance of Jordan’s monarchy. Jordan’s regime
has even been able to reduce external price shocks due to increasing production capacity
(Ritcher 17). Overall, Ritcher argues the distribution of material resources as the main
source of Jordan’s authoritarian durability.
Peters and Moore take the argument of foreign aid one-step further and explain
how Jordan’s “supply and demand” strategy allows the regime to maintain durability.
“The Jordanian rentier state is not exclusively a product of external rents, particularly
foreign aid, but also of the demands of the coalition encompassing groups with highly
disparate economic policy preferences” (Peters and Moore 256). Through distributive
institutions, Jordan makes rent-fueled side payments to coalition members (Peters and
Moore 256). The purpose of the distributive institutions is to sustain a heterogeneous
coalition, consisting of Transjordanian tribes and a Syrian/pre-1967 Palestinian based
merchant elite (Peters and Moore 257). “Assisted by geopolitically motivated donors, the
Hashemites have adapted institutions over time to tap a diverse supply of rents that range
from economic and military aid to protocol trade, allowing them to retain power through
periods of late development, domestic political crisis, and neoliberal conditionality”
(Peters and Moore 256). The side payments and distribution of rents have come as a
result of delayed development, brutal civil clashes, changing demographics, and
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neoliberalism. The modified distribution institutions “explain authoritarian durability in a
small state of significant geostrategic value to external patrons” (Peters and Moore 257).
Many scholars argue in favor of political reasons. One of these arguments
includes legal reasons, such as the creation of laws and reforms, as to why Jordan’s
regime continues to endure. This has helped quell the protests in Jordan and satisfy some
demands (Burger 9). Cautious reforms have allowed Jordan’s monarchy to remain stable
(Bauer and Schiller 1). Burger reveals how the recent reforms and laws enacted by the
king were similar to the ones in the past in response to protests. For example, “elections
and parliamentary activity was reintroduced in 1989. Yet, the election laws of 1989, 1993
and 2001 were designed in a way that allowed the regime to control the parliament’s
composition while keeping the electoral process legitimate in the eyes of the voters and
the international community” (Burger 9). Not to mention the Political Parties Law was
enacted in 1992, which still exists today, but the opposition parties barely have power as
they are extremely factionalized. The goal of these various laws and reforms were
implemented to allow opposition parties to blow off steam through political pluralism
(Burger 9). “This fosters the perception that the purpose of these legal-formal actions was
again only window dressing to manifest commitment to democratic reform without
actually changing the regime structure” (Burger 17). The revision of the recent Public
Gathering Law is one that proves this argument. In the end, the activists do not end up
calling for a regime change because they are content with reforms (Burger 9).
Symbolism is also an argument under political reasons for the endurance of
Jordan’s monarchy post Arab Spring. Burger argues that “the use of democratic language
or discourses to distract from undemocratic rule, symbolic acts and decisions, and the
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framing of the royal family as above the political fray” are symbolic mechanisms that
allow Jordan’s monarchy to endure (Burger 9). For example, King Abdullah frequently
uses democratic language in his speeches, such as the need for democracy as a “national
and unwavering choice” (Burger 9). This use of democratic language implies that the
king will make reforms, but most of the time he does not follow through with tangible
reforms. The king has also been able to push aside political reforms through the focus on
economic development. These actions have prevented criticism of the king. Lastly,
through these mechanisms, the king presents himself as non-partisan and blames the
government for unpopular reforms, rather than the royal family (Burger 9-10). For
example, King Abdullah blamed his Prime Minister Mr. Bakhit for the lack of reforms
after facing public pressure in concern to the reforms (Burger 18). Burger writes, “it is
again a tool to portray the king’s responsiveness to public demands by using politicians
as scapegoats for political and economic aberrations without having to take
responsibility” (Burger 9-10).
In addition to reforms and symbolism, the strategy of inclusion is also seen as a
political reason for the endurance of Jordan post Arab Spring. Over time the king has
included business elites into the regime. “The King created the Economic Consultative
Council (ECC) as an institutionalized stepping-stone for young, Western-oriented
business men. Via the ECC, they gradually acquired offices in the government” (Burger
11). This step has included political elites into parliament, where opposition becomes
more institutionalized, and thus more controllable. Political elites will still be
oppositional, but they are more loyal once they become part of parliament (Burger 11).
Conrad points out how past kings have even included the Muslim Brotherhood in the
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legislature and gave them concessions when they became an increasing threat to the
regime (Conrad 1). “The Muslim Brotherhood stopped criticizing the regime in public
and rallying people to its cause when it was given some say over policy in the legislature.
King Hussein’s decision to bring the group into the political process resulted in their
demands being announced within the confines of the existing institutional regime”
(Conrad 18). The inclusion strategy came in handy when the protests occurred in Jordan.
Many of the oppositional political elites were still in favor of a legitimate constitutional
monarchy, but they stayed loyal to the royal family. Regardless, oppositional forces in
parliament still protested in Jordan, but “inclusionary legitimation ensured the acceptance
of the rulers by economic or political elites and served to either strengthening the support
base by promoting certain figures or to broaden the support base by bringing new elites
into the system” (Burger 11).
A widely used political argument among scholars for Jordan’s endurance is the
strategy of divide and rule. This is done through elite rotation, magnifying societal
cleavages, undermining oppositional demands, and creating structural restrictions.
Through elite rotation, King Abdullah II has appointed many different prime ministers to
keep Jordanians content. Elite rotation has been occurring since Jordan’s independence in
1946 and most recently in the past few years since the Arab Spring. Burger writes,
“individual ministers or entire cabinets have been dismissed by the king without ever
changing the basic political structure significantly. The pool of recruitment, however,
stays the same” (Burger 12). Most of the time, prime ministers are just reinstated or
reshuffled. Jordan’s king uses this strategy to appease Jordanian citizens when they are
unhappy with the corruption or the political situations in the country. The protesters have
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recently been calling for elected prime ministers, but to this day, the strategy of elite
rotation has worked for the most part (Burger 12). Aside from elite rotation, the Jordanian
government exacerbates societal cleavages as a part of their divide and rule strategy.
“The Transjordanian-Palestinian issue is the societal cleavage used the most for dividing
the population as well as opposition. Basically, Palestinian Jordanians are considered by
Transjordanians to be “less Jordanian” and thus less loyal to the royal family and the
state” (Burger 13). On top of the Transjordanian-Palestinan cleavage, there is a divide in
Jordan among government supporters and government opponents, and ultimately the
regime loyalists silence the criticizing voices of the opponents. The societal cleavages
“[have] rendered the Jordanian opposition weak and fragmented” (Burger 13).
To further explain the divide and rule strategy, Burger articulates the
government’s actions to undermine oppositional demands. King Abdullah II will
undermine oppositional demands by regarding them as outdated ideas and ideologies. At
times, King Abdullah II will also turn oppositional demands into his own by calling for
reforms on his own. “Although this does not often translate into legislation, the king can
thereby claim to take care of these issues and that further protests by the opposition are
only intended to disturb public order since, from his point of view, he is taking care of it”
(Burger 13). Lastly, structural restrictions are part of the divide and rule strategy. The
Jordanian government applies restrictions in a few different ways. Firstly, the Jordanian
regime limits freedoms on the media and association, which weaken the voice of
opposition groups (Burger 13). It is also evident that the elections law restrains
opposition groups from gaining spots in parliament and prevents “parties from
consolidating into broader blocs” (Burger 14).
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Furthermore, the government brought forward loyal businessmen as a growing
influence to weaken parliament and developed the ECC into a parallel government under
King Abdullah II’s control. “This allowed him to counterbalance the conventional
institutions ensuring their weakness and his ultimate control over political decision
making” (Burger 14). In addition, King Abdullah uses his ability to dissolve parliament
and postpone elections when opposition groups start to gain more influence (Burger 14).
The divide and rule strategy allows King Abdullah II to maintain power, as he reshuffles
parliament, exacerbates societal cleavages, undermines opposition demands, and weakens
opposition groups through restrictions and marginalization.
Pluralism and the toleration of limited dissent are also viewed as political
arguments for the endurance of Jordan’s monarchy. This political strategy has allowed
Jordan’s regime to turn “radical resistance into controlled opposition. As such, pluralist
policies function as valuable mechanisms of social control rather than instruments of
collective empowerment” (Boukhars 3). When political opposition groups channel their
dissent, Jordan’s monarchy is better able to assess the magnitude of opposition in regards
to their policies and the probability of the opposition turning into militancy (Boukhars 3).
Overall, Jordan’s political strategy of pluralism has allowed the regime to control
opposition groups and prevent radical resistance.
Finally, some scholars have favored of the “threat” argument under political
reasons. Burger portrayed how the threat of chaos without the monarchy discourages
people from protesting or calling for a regime change. “The Hashemites portray
themselves as indispensable for Jordan’s well being because of their claimed role as
mediators between rivaling groups. It is stipulated that without the royal family, Jordan
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would head directly into chaos and the aforementioned rivalries would lead to violent
power struggles” (Burger 11). Many Jordanian citizens believe that a violent power
struggle would occur in their country between rivalries, such as Northern tribes versus
Southern tribes and Palestinians versus Transjordanians, if the royal family were taken
down. Jordan’s monarchy even highlights how Western powers or its neighboring
countries could control their country without the royal family in place. Ultimately, many
Jordanian citizens choose not to call for a regime change because they fear life will
become chaotic in their country without the monarchy in place (Burger 11).
With regards to social reasons, some scholars argue that the rising status of the
middle class in Jordan and “aspiring cosmopolitanism” strengthens the regime. These
notions have created a new structure of social organization in Jordan’s capital. “This
reorients the populace away from failed political reforms and serves as a means to
reinforce the status-quo, particularly in the context of deepening internal divisions and a
region in turmoil” (Tobin 96). The rising notion of “aspiring cosmopolitanism” in Jordan
has come as a result of the creation of neoliberal economic reforms. Over the years there
have been a rising number of Jordanians from East Amman traveling to West Amman in
hopes of work and leisure activity, which has led to an increase in employment in the
service sector and private commercial spaces. “In such spaces, both East and West
Ammanis prioritize cosmopolitan constructs of economic, political, and cultural forms of
sociality that closely resemble those of the elites. They emphasize inclusiveness and
democracy rather than ‘internecine conflict, resurgent nationalism, and all sorts of bloody
‘othering,’” (Tobin 98-99).
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Notions of cosmopolitanism have been shaped through employment in the service
sector and leisure activities in commercial areas, such as coffee shops, which allows
middle class Jordanians to model themselves after elites as “aspiring cosmopolitans.”
Overall, “the middle-class orientation has emerged as a king of imagined community
displacing overtly political nationalism and replacing ethnic, religious and other forms of
elitism, factioning and sectarianism with a class-based cohesion that still carries
important political implications” (Tobin 100). King Abdullah II has been able to use the
rise of cosmopolitanism and social cohesion as a way to avoid radical protests. For
example, King Abdullah II has made various announcements calling for an end to
protests that can disrupt the unity of Jordan. Ultimately, the notion of cosmopolitanism
has united the Jordanian middle class and elites, allowing the Hashemite regime to use
the preservation of unity to its advantage in averting revolution (Tobin 105).
Throughout the Arab Spring, Jordan’s monarchy has been able to endure. Various
protests have occurred in Jordan over the past few years, but due to religious,
economical, political, and social reasons, Jordan’s monarchy remains stable. Overall,
most Jordanian citizens are just looking for reforms under the regime, rather than a
complete regime change in Jordan.

Berger 62
Chapter 2: Algeria

Following the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, protests began to occur in Algeria
in December of 2010. The major protests took place in the capital, while a number of
other minor protests spread across the country. Inspired by the Arab Spring, Algeria has
faced many demonstrations over the last few years, however, the regime continues to
endure as a result of historical events, presidential tactics, military repression, and
economic reasons.
Algeria’s Regime
Algeria, formally known as the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria,
operates as a semi-presidential republic. Abdelaziz Bouteflika is the current president of
Algeria and rules the National Liberation Front (FLN) (Migdalovitz 1). “Today, Algeria
has a bicameral parliament, encompassing a directly elected 380-member lower house,
the National Assembly, and a partly appointed and partly indirectly elected upper
chamber, the Council of the Nation” (Zoubir 180). The president has the power to appoint
the majority of the Council of the Nation, while local and regional assemblies are given
the authority to elect two-thirds of the Council. According to the constitution of 1996,
Bouteflika was supposed to serve two terms as president, but Bouteflika himself
introduced constitutional amendments that were approved by parliament in November of
2008, allowing him to stay in power for more than two terms (Zoubir 181).
The security forces make up a major part of Algeria’s regime. This includes
Algeria’s security services and military hierarchy. “In 1999, Foreign Minister Abdelaziz
Bouteflika, a civilian with vital military backing, won the presidential election after all
other candidates withdrew, charging fraud” (Migdalovitz 1). Ultimately, Algeria’s
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security forces remain completely loyal to the regime and support President Bouteflika
through rigged elections. Bouteflika still has some autonomy from the military and the
ability to remove senior officers if he chooses to do so. “Bouteflika now serves as both
commnder in chief and minister of defense. Following his reelection to a second term in
April 2004, Bouteflika strengthened his control over the armed forces by appointing a
close associate as secretary-general of the Ministry of Defense and appointing other
loyalists as heads of Algeria’s six military regions” (Zoubir 188).
Regardless of Bouteflika’s power over the security forces the military still has
significant strength over the population, due to the past civil wars, Islamist threat, and
war on terrorism. Through these engagements, the security services, the Department of
Intelligence and Security (DRS), preside over various appointments of ministers and
ambassadors (Zoubir 188). This group manipulates sectors of society, such as the media
and political parties, in order to ensure election results. They also hold significant power
in state affairs (Zoubir 189). Ultimately, “while the role of the armed forces has greatly
diminished, elected officials – including the chief executive—do not have final say over
legislation and policy, given the political weight of the DRS” (Zoubir 189).
The pro-government parties that dominate parliament together make up the
“Presidential Alliance” (Zoubir 189). These parties include the National Liberation Front
(FLN), Democratic National Rally (RND), and the Islamist MSP. The FLN holds the
majority of seats in parliament (Zoubir 189). Even with pro-government parties operating
in parliament, Bouteflika still buys off the groups with major salary increases before the
elections to ensure his stability as leader of Algeria (Zoubir 181). “Political parties—
secular and religious--- exist, but they have no aspiration to accede to power. They are
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content with having representatives in the parliament in part because a portion of their
salaries goes to the parties’ coffers” (Zoubir 182).
The original oppositional figures were among radical Islamists, Louisa Hanoune’s
Workers’ Party, and the General Union of Algerian Workers. “Since the civil war of the
1990s, the regime has successively neutered both of the main Islamist parties, allowing
them to participate in elections and including them in governing coalitions, tempting
them with the fruits of power, and then watching their support slump as they compromise
to stay in Parliament” (J. Brown). Today there are a number of moderate Islamist political
parties in Algeria’s parliament, such as MSP, Isah, and En-Nahda (Zoubir 189).
Hanoune’s Workers’ Party was a main oppositional force in the 1990s, but has since
transformed into a supporter of the Algerian regime. The General Union of Algerian
Workers was a main opposition force in the 1988 revolt, but “since the end of the war,
the Union has been decisively compromised by the replacement of the leadership with
regime-friendly apparatchiks” and did not take any action in the recent protests (J.
Brown).
With concern to opposition groups, there are a couple of other secularist parties
that are allowed to be included in Algeria’s parliament, such as Front of Socialist Forces
(FFS) and Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD). “Given the ongoing role of security
services behind the scenes of the political arena and the rigged nature of a party system
that contains within it no real, active political opposition, it is not surprising that
Algerians are increasingly indifferent to parties and politics in general (Zoubir 190).
Thus, most of the recent Arab Spring protests in Algeria were unorganized, except for a
couple of protests arranged by specific groups, such as, Rally for Culture and Democracy
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(RCD), Algerian League for Defense of Human Rights (LADDH), Coordination for
Change and Democracy (CNCD), Zionist groups, and an umbrella group consisting of
human rights leaders, lawyers, and unionists. The population understands the limited
mobility of political parties to create reforms and bring about real change, especially
oppositional ones (Zoubir 182). Even so, “President Bouteflika recognized the threat such
momentum [from opposition groups] could pose to his regime (S. Brown 15).
Protests in Algeria
Algeria experienced its first protest after the start of the Arab Spring on December
23, 2010, shortly after the Tunisian uprising. As opposed to Jordan, Algeria’s first protest
turned violent after a week. The protest occurred in Algeria’s capital in the Les Palmiers
neighborhood over insufficient housing. A total of fifty-three people were injured, but
fifty-two of them were a part of the security forces, while only one was a civilian. The
protesters were unhappy with the fact that the government threatened to take away their
housing in parts of Les Palmiers and relocate them to newer houses in a different area
(“Scores Hurts”).
The Algerian government created the new housing plan in 1984, but the protests
began as the Tunisian uprising inspired demonstrators and the government started to
revive the project. The protesters demanded to be a part of the beneficiaries list. “Chronic
housing shortages are a serious issue in the capital, with many young people forced to
stay with their parents well into adulthood” (“Scores Hurt”). The demonstrations even
extended into surrounding neighborhoods, such as Ennakhil, Laaquiba, Diar el Babor and
Cervantes, where residents were also upset with the inadequate housing. Many protesters
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attacked police officers with Molotov cocktails and stones, leading up to the clash
(“Scores Hurt”)
Protests started up again in Algeria on January 3, 2011 and lasted until January
10, 2011. Rather than inadequate housing, the protests were sparked by the rise in price
of food staples. Included are milk and sugar, which are basic essential foods for
Algerians. The protesters were reported to be mainly young males, but they created a lot
of violence. “They are burning tires, breaking into buildings, breaking everything....We
can hear the screams,” said journalist Lania Tagzout (“Protests Intensifying”). The rise in
price of food staples sparked the weeklong protests, but the civilians were also unhappy
with the ongoing issue with housing and the high rate of unemployment. All of these
issues have been brewing over time in Algeria, but once again, the uprising in Tunisia
triggered the protests. A particular group or leader did not organize the demonstrations,
therefore forming chaos, such as many injuries among security forces and the protesters.
The police were not liable for many of the injuries, but they did use tear gas to break up
the protests. Even with the number of injuries, the dissidents explained, "everyone
understands that things will only change through violence” (“Protest Intensifying”).
The weeklong protests in the beginning of January 2011 heightened after Friday
prayers on January 7th. Algerian security forces armed themselves with tear gas and
weapons outside of mosques in the capital, but protesters still attacked the police forces
with stones and hard objects. The first death occurred outside the capital in Msila, as a
result of the clash. “The official APS news agency said protesters ransacked government
buildings, bank branches and post offices in ‘several eastern cities’ overnight, including
Constantine, Jijel, Setif and Bouira” (Chikhi). The protesters made their way over to
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schools and gas utility buildings run by the state. Even so, analysts predicted that the
uprisings would not turn into similar actions in the 1990s that created a ten-year civil war.
The demonstrators continued to complain about high unemployment rates, which were
noted to be between ten and twenty-five percent, and food prices that doubled in 2010.
Overall, “the riots, more intense than the periodic outbreaks of unrest the country of 35
million has grown accustomed to, put authorities under pressure to deliver economic
results that reflect strengthening state revenues from energy exports” (Chikhi). More than
just minor grievances, the protesters expressed their need for major change that
encompassed values of freedom and development (Chikhi).
The following day, on January 8, 2011, two people were murdered as a result of
the riots over food prices and high rates of unemployment. The two deaths occurred in
Tipaza province and Msila province. Some reports claimed that the killings were linked
to police shootings, but official reports never confirmed the assault. Along with the
killings, over 400 people were injured. Even the Algerian Football Federation postponed
league matches that could have sparked protests. “The riots are widely seen as drawing
on deep frustrations with the ruling elite and a lack of political freedom, as well as more
immediate concerns about the cost of living, housing, and jobs” (“Overnight Riots”).
The next day, on January 9, 2011, a third person was murdered in the clash, which
triggered the Algerian government to reconsider the high food prices (“Reports”).
Roberts claims that the private sector traders initiated the price increases, as the
government does not have the ability to create these changes (“Reports”) Regardless, the
private sector traders raised prices on staple goods “in reaction to the government's
attempts to impose new regulations on their transactions. The government's decision was,
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in principle, part of the necessary and long overdue attempt to curb the rampant informal
sector of the economy by subjecting the trade in foodstuffs to basic regulation and to
bring it back into the formal sector” (Roberts). Roberts claims that Algeria has faced
many protests in the past regarding rising prices and unemployment, but the weeklong
protests had completely changed the dynamic of demonstrations in Algeria, as it occurred
across the country, simultaneously, and at a great speed from the beginning of January
2011 (Roberts).
Roberts further explains how Algeria’s national daily newspaper, El Watan,
reported the protests as riots that could possibly turn into ones similar to those in October
of 1988. In October of 1988, Algeria experienced bloody and traumatic clashes, where
Algerian troops opened fire on innocent civilians after the army commanders announced
a State of Siege. Even so, the army had not acted at this point in time during the January
2011 weeklong protests and instead practiced restraint. The outcome of the weeklong
protests was unclear at the end of the week, but it ended up dying down until late
January, with the exception of some self-immolations, as the government made a few
announcements in regards to the rising prices to calm the crowds (Roberts).
Throughout mid January, a number of self-immolations took place. This was a
way to remake the start of the Tunisian revolution when Mohamed Bouazizi lit himself
on fire in front of a government building. On January 17, 2011, Mohsen Bouterfif, an
Algerian citizen, set himself on fire and died in front of a government building, the
Boukhadra town hall. “The paper reported that it happened after a meeting with the
mayor who was unable to provide Bouterfif with a job and a house. About 100 young
men protested over Mohsen's death in the town, in Tebessa province, 700 km east of
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Algiers” (Algerian Dies). Earlier in the week, three other Algerians attempted to kill
themselves as a form of protest; one did so outside the domestic intelligence agency
headquarters. Bouterfif was the first death as a result of Algerian self-immolations in
2011 (“Algerian Dies”).
On January 21, 2011, large protests started up again in the Algerian capital. The
protests occurred as a result of a government ban on protests against the regime. The
protests attempted to make their way to a government building in Algiers. As a result, a
clash occurred between the protesters and the security forces. “Opposition leaders say 42
people were injured and taken to a hospital. The state-run APS news agency says seven
officers were injured, two seriously” (“Police”). The demonstrators waved the Algerian
flag and the Tunisian flag to reveal their support for change, while the security forces
commanded control with their batons (“Police”).
On January 29, 2011, a massive protest took place in Bejaja, a northeastern city in
Algeria. This time 10,000 protesters showed up to a rally. “Demonstrators marched
peacefully in the city in Algeria’s Berber-speaking Kabylie region, shouting Tunisiainspired slogans such as: ‘For a radical change of the regime!,’ a lawmaker with the
opposition Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), Mohamed Ikhervane, told AFP”
(France Presse). This was the first large protest in Algeria that was organized by a group,
Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD). The protest did not turn out to be violent, but
the police surrounded the city, which led to a calm dispersion of the demonstrators. Aside
from the RCD, the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH), a prodemocracy opposition group, also declared its plans for an organized protest in the capital
on February 12, 2011 (France Presse).
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On February 8, 2011, university students started an “indefinite strike”. Rather
than grievances over unemployment and rising prices, the students protested the teaching
quality in Algeria. Over 500 students showed up to the protest as they boycotted class in
the capital. They demanded better education and a brand new qualification system across
the cities of Algiers, Annaba, Tlemcen, and Oran. “Following a presidential decree of
December 2010, the formerly used ‘master’ degree is now replaced by a ‘magisterial’
degree, which also would mean that an engineer education will now end up with a title
equivalent to a ‘professional education’” (“Large Student”). This change angered the
students because it completely disregarded any previous dedications to a specific degree.
In addition to these issues, the students were unhappy with the poor studying conditions
and the lack of job availability (“Large Student”).
The dynamic of the Algerian protests completely changed on February 12, 2011,
the day after Hosni Mubarak resigned as Egypt’s autocratic leader. In Algiers, “heavily
outnumbered by riot police, thousands of Algerians defied government warnings and
dodged barricades to rally in their capital Saturday, demanding democratic reforms”
(“400 Arrested”). An umbrella group, mainly joined by human rights leaders, lawyers,
unionists, and a number of other groups, arranged the demonstration. The main purpose
of the protest was to demand democratic reforms rather than oust Bouteflika. The
officials reported that only about 1,500 people made it to the rally, but over 10,000
Algerians showed up to the protest, as they made their way over the barricades. The
demonstrators protested against a police state and demanded an Algerian government
“for the people” (“400 Arrested”).
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Clashes occurred between the insurgents and the security forces, but there was no
reported violence. The Algerian security forces arrested about 400 protesters for a short
time period. Inspired by the successful uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the opposition
finally spoke out about its anger with the law on public protests and the need for change
in Algeria. Ali Rachedi, the prior leader of the Front of Socialist Forces party, explained,
“‘this demonstration is a success because it's been 10 years that people haven't been able
to march in Algiers and there's a sort of psychological barrier,’” as he expressed the new
absence of fear in Algeria (“400 Arrested”).
Furthermore, the demonstrators were unhappy with President Bouteflika’s
unwillingness to end the state of emergency. The state of emergency was first declared in
the 1990s when Algeria experienced a violent Islamist insurgency. “Opponents say he
should have long ago ended a state of emergency declared at the start of that civil strife,
and is doing too little to use Algeria's vast oil and gas wealth to help the bulk of its 35
million people” (“400 Arrested”). The opposition groups realized that Bouteflika retained
the state of emergency only as a political weapon to restrict all protests. Bouteflika
claimed that he would soon lift the state of emergency, but the group of protesters still
went through with the rally on February 12, 2011, which ended up being a congregation
at the First of May Square in Algiers (“400 Arrested”).
Along with the grievances that fueled the state of emergency on February 12,
2011, blocked Facebook and Internet pages angered the protesters. “It was the apparent
government attack on the internet which was of particular significance to those calling for
an end to President Abdelaziz Boutifleka's repressive regime” (Ramdani). With the prior
uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, organized by the Internet, the Algerian government felt
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the need to block pages that could mobilize opponents in Algeria. A number of the
demonstrators were detained for quite some time after operating violent rallies
(Ramdani).
On February 18, 2011, Algeria was placed on high alert for upcoming protests
and rallies for democracy. The Algerian government promised the Algerian citizens that
it would end the state of emergency, but the opposition groups called for protests every
Saturday regardless of the announcement. “Demonstrators said people now felt less
scared of taking to the streets. The protest organizers said the government’s offer to lift
the state of emergency was a red herring as it could simply be replaced by an even more
repressive anti-terrorist law” (Chrisafis).
On February 22, 2011, the Algerian government finally lifted the state of
emergency. Protests died down until the beginning of March 2011. On March 2, 2011, a
large group of protesting men marched to Algeria’s parliament. Rather than the usual
opposition leaders and unhappy youths, “they were Communal Guards, state-armed
militia on the front line of the country's long battle with Islamist extremists, and their
protest served as an eloquent example of the breadth of social unrest in this gas-rich
North African nation” (“Algeria Keeps Lid”). The grievances among the Algerians
protesting in the first few months of 2011 finally caught up with the Communal Guards,
as they too started to express anger towards the government. The Guards expressed their
unwillingness to clash with the state, but “they feel humiliated by lowly government job
offers put forward now that the service is gradually being disbanded, and emboldened by
the protesters from all quarters of society” (“Algeria Keeps Lid”).
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The protest among the Communal Guards came as a result of the government’s
lifting of the state of emergency. This ban led to dispersion of the security forces, as they
are no longer needed. They were disgruntled with their lack of income, rights, medical
benefits, and housing. The Communal Guards believe that they should not be receiving
lower class jobs, such as housekeepers, when they have fought against terrorism before.
Ultimately, the force was upset about its loss of power and “the consensus is the same:
any hope for democracy in Algeria means dismantling the military pedestal on which the
regime sits — not removing a president” (“Algeria Keeps Lid”).
A few days later, on March 5, 2011, a protest took place on behalf of the National
Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNCD) to demand a regime change. The
Algerian security forces and pro-government demonstrators were able to halt the protest
and counter the chaos. The CNCD were upset with the restriction on political protests and
called the protest in three different cities throughout Algeria. “Counter-demonstrators
carrying photos of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika chanted ‘Bouteflika Is Not (Hosni)
Mubarak’ -- the Egyptian president forced out by a popular uprising on February 18.
They chased and roughed up the anti-government protestors” (Police, Pro Government).
The counter demonstrators were young, violent, and even threatened to lynch one of the
members of the CNCD, who also happened to be the leader of the RCD. The CNCD was
originally founded during the late January protests, but some of the independent trade
unions decided to leave the party, as the CNCD did not match their interests. “The CNCD
has said it wants the immediate end of Bouteflika's regime, citing the same problems of
high unemployment, housing and soaring costs that inspired the uprisings in Tunisia and
Egypt” (“Police, Pro-Government”). The CNCD took on a more radical approach to the
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protests and called for the end to Bouteflika’s regime, rather than the policy changes most
protesters were looking for.
Two days later on March 7, 2011, a second protest took place on behalf of the
security forces in Algeria. Over 2,000 members of the forces showed up to the rally. The
Algerian Municipal Guards gathered in Martyrs’ Square in Algiers. They were unhappy
with their low wages, and therefore demanded raises and early retirement. These are the
same guards that fought the Islamist militants in the early 1990s. “The government has
considered dissolving the municipal police by redeploying its officers to other bodies
including the army. But officers have rejected that, demanding a salary rise with
retroactive effect as of 2008 or early retirement” (Disgruntled Police). To counter this
protest, the Algerian government sent out the Algerian police to stabilize the
demonstration (“Disgruntled Police”).
The protests died down in Algeria until March 16 and March 23. A slight clash
occurred on March 16, 2011. A number of young males decided to throw petrol bombs
and stones in the Diar el Mahsoul neighborhood. The police used tear gas to break up the
riot. The protesters expressed minor problems that they wanted changed, such as their
housing. Other than that, the young males did not have many political demands. About
sixty of the males demanded to meet with senior politicians about their housing issues
and tried to block a road to get their way. “‘We live like dogs. We live in one apartment
with the whole family and we have been here since the 1960s,’ one young protester told
Reuters” (“Update 1”). Eventually about 150 males joined in, while 300 police officers
were deployed to cater to the scene.
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A week later, on March 23, 2011, a similar riot occurred in Algiers. This time five
police officers were hurt in the riots, where the protesters threw stones and petrol bombs.
The demonstrators were trying to halt the bulldozing operation that was meant to take
down illegally built houses. The insurgents also decided to set a car on fire and throw
bricks at the police officers using tear gas to break up the riot. “The clashes, in the Oued
Koriche suburb of Algiers, began when local officials ordered the demolition of more
than 30 houses built on publicly-owned land without a permit. Police in protective gear
formed a shield around bulldozers which moved in to demolish the houses” (“Algerian
Police)”. The protesters were unable to successfully stop the bulldozers and the buildings
were destroyed (“Algerian Police”).
After March, the protests died in Algeria, with the exception of a few rallies and a
couple of strikes. On June 23, 2011, a terrorist group committing a bomb attack targeted a
military patrol. One of the soldiers died and another one was injured. As a result,
Algerian soldiers entered the villages in Azazga, part of the Kabylie region, and shot the
wrong civilian, who happened to be innocent. “The regional governor of Tizi Ouzou,
Abdelkader Bouazghi, reacted angrily, saying, ‘there was a man killed, sacking, theft,
destruction of property and violation of privacy’” (“Algerian Village”). To stand up for
the innocent civilian, opposition groups organized a demonstration after the funeral. The
defense ministry announced its mistake and the Maghreb and African affairs minister,
Abdelkader Messahel, blamed the attack on terrorist groups, mainly radical Islamists that
armed themselves with weapons from Libya (“Algerian Village”)
A few months later, on September 16 and 17 of 2011, Algerian citizens called for
nationwide protests against the president’s regime and the Algerian army. In response,

Berger 76
the Algerian security forces and the interior ministry were placed on high alert. Reports
clamed that ‘Zionist’ groups organized the protest on Facebook and targeted the young
Algerian citizens to incite them. Ould Kablia, the Algerian interior minister said, “‘had it
been people inside [the country], we would have exposed and arrested them, but the clues
point us toward foreign parties in relation with the Zionist entity,’” and the “initial
investigation showed that there was a lack of popular support for the protest call”
(“Algerian Authorities”). The Facebook page only attracted 1,500 members, but had the
goal of a revolution on September 17, 2011 for a “‘free state with free people’”
(“Algerian Authorities”). Kabila explained how the Facebook protest was meant to
disturb national order in Algeria, but it failed to successfully mobilize the Algerian
citizens (“Algerian Authorities”).
A month later, on October 9, 2011, a rally took place in Algiers over the lack of
jobs. The CNCD, unemployment rights activist group, organized the protest. “The group
had called the rally to demand more jobs, improved unemployment benefits and the right
to demonstrate freely,” but the Algerian police arrested about twenty-five members
(“Algerian Arrest”). The Algerian security forces felt obligated to arrest some of the
protesters, as they planned on mimicking the violent protests of 1988 for democracy.
Overall, the protest was contained and did not turn into a large movement (“Algerian
Arrest”).
In 2012, opposition groups failed to organize successful protests for the most part.
In February of 2012, the main opposition groups based on Islam announced its decision
to run as allies in the May 2012 parliamentary elections. “The alliance of three of the
country’s fractious Islamist parties increases the likelihood of Algeria following in the
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steps of three other North African countries where Islamists have recently triumphed at
the ballot box” (Ouali). The parties had the goal of forming an Arab Spring, similar to the
successful ones in Tunisia and Egypt. With this in mind, the parties also requested the
alliance of other parties with similar interests. The parties expressed their optimism for
success, as elections in Tunisia and Egypt ended with Islamist-dominated parliaments.
Algeria’s government did not view this as a threat, as Algerians normally fear religious
parties ever since the 1992 military coup and bloody civil war prompted by the Islamist
militants (Ouali).
Leading up to Algerian elections in May 2012, a number of sporadic attempted
protests occurred in Algiers. Algerian authorities took action through tactics, such as
detainment, to prevent citizens from protesting peacefully against the government.
Algerian security forces even arrested one of the candidates for the Algerian elections.
The security forces also fended off suspected demonstrators from heading to the capital
(Algeria: Crackdown). Aside from the protest attempts, Algeria’s population simmered
down, even after the election. “Barely a week after a vote derided by much of the
population as a sham, there are no protests in the streets of this capital city. In a volatile
region, there are no marches, no rallies and no demonstrations” (Nossiter).
Nossiter explains that sixty to eighty percent of the population boycotted the vote,
as they knew the military-backed regime would claim victory over the Islamist opposition
candidates, but they did not even organize a demonstration (Nossiter). With the exception
of a minor protest, where an Internet blogger called for a mass violent protest against the
elections, many Algerians did not voice their opinions against the Algerian elections
(Honda). Ultimately, “the police [were] everywhere, and though criticism flow[ed] freely
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in the street, it [was] sometimes delivered anonymously, and with a glance over the
shoulder” (Nossiter).
Aside from the anti-government protests, Algerian citizens made a few calls for
protests in regards to a small American Youtube film. The film was considered
disrespectful to Islam’s Prophet Muhammad. The anger was geared towards Americans
and even turned into an attack on the American embassy in Libya. “The Algiers embassy
said unspecified groups were using online social networks to organize demonstrations ‘to
protest a range of issues’” (Craggs). The demonstration did not end up moving to Algeria,
but the U.S Embassy warned Americans to stay clear of official buildings and crowded
places in Algeria, especially after the Gaddafi family fled to Algiers (Craggs).
In 2013, a couple of anti-government protests occurred sporadically in Algiers
and provinces close to the capital. Similar to the original protests in 2011, violent
demonstrations occurred in Algiers on behalf of the youth population in regards to rising
food prices and unemployment. The protesters also condemned declining government
services. The protests turned violent when the insurgents started throwing stones at the
police forces. In the Bab el-Oued neighborhood, the rioters made their way to police
headquarters and stormed the building, which led Algerian authorities to place security
forces on high alert. Similar protests occurred in Zeralda, Esharaqa, Tibaza, and Oran.
Aijbali reported, “government-owned TV channels completely ignored the protests in
their news casts at night on Wednesday and instead reported on the progress of
government housing and infrastructure projects across the country” (Aijbaili). Most
recently protests have died down due to the focus on the hostage crisis, where a number
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of foreigners were taken hostage by Al Qaeda terrorists in an Algeria’s gas plant
(Ahmed).
Algeria’s Response
In response to the protests in Algeria over the past few years, Algeria’s
government has made a number of minor changes to appease the protesters. The earliest
announcements and changes were made in the first week of January of 2011. At first, the
government made a few comments concerning the rising prices. Government officials
claimed that the price increases would be cancelled. To deal with the surface problem, the
Algerian government also looked to religious leaders to calm down the rioters. Lastly, a
number of senior regime leaders took it upon themselves to request that the protesters
“demonstrate peacefully” (Roberts).
President Bouteflika also stated that the state of emergency was soon to be lifted.
He never set a date, but this was a major announcement, as the state of emergency had
been in place since the early 1990s. Along with the state of emergency, the government
vowed to lower taxes and increase the number of wheat supplies to stores (“Middle
East”). Mainly, the Algerian regime promised to reduce taxes and “import duties on some
staple goods” (Algeria Vows). Their goal was to ultimately cut down on the price of basic
foods, such as sugar and oil, by forty-one percent. Lastly, the government responded with
harsh actions by committing to punish any rioters, especially those that became violent.
The interior minister, Dahou Ould Kabila, said “around 1,000 protestors had been
arrested, many of them minors, during the weekend disturbances, adding that they
would appear before judges” (“Algeria Vows”).
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On February 3, 2011, Bouteflika made another announcement with regards to the
state of emergency. He claimed that he would soon lift the rule, but there would still be
restrictions on protests in Algiers. Also, Bouteflika announced that Algerians would even
have better access to media sources, such as television and radio. The state controls the
Algerian television and radio programs and barely broadcasts opposing views, but
Bouteflika declared his willingness to allow political parties on the air. Finally,
Bouteflika addressed the issue of unemployment and urged the government to adopt new
initiatives to create jobs in Algeria (Lowe and Chikhi).
The government always had a fear of Islamist insurgents since the last civil war in
Algeria, but it understood that concessions needed to be made in order to ensure a lasting
regime without protests. Lowe and Chikhi claimed, “nevertheless, the announcement by
Bouteflika reflects the ability -- proven many times before -- of Algeria's ruling elite to
adapt to changing circumstances and do what is necessary to stay in power” (Lowe and
Chikhi). Bouteflika did not want the Arab Spring to reach Algeria the way it did in
Tunisia, and therefore attempted to make some minor compromises for the Algerian
citizens.
On February 14, 2011, the Algerian government announced its plans to officially
remove the state of emergency rule. This came right after Algeria experienced weeklong
protests around Algeria demanding government reform and a change to leadership. The
Foreign Minister of Algeria, Mourad Medelci, claimed, “‘soon, we will discuss the past,
but I say that lifting the state of emergency will occur in the coming days,’” and “it will
mean a ‘return to Algeria, a rightful state which totally allows, the expression of
opinions, but always with reference to the law’” (“Algeria To Lift”). The president did
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not release the exact date he would lift the ban, but he promised that he would take these
actions in the upcoming days (“Algeria To Lift”).
A few days later, on February 22, 2011, Algeria’s cabinet voted to lift the state of
emergency rule. In response to the massive protests across Algeria, the government
feared an uprising, similar to the ones that took down authoritarian leadership in Tunisia
and Egypt. The state of emergency rule was a common grievance among the Algerian
protesters. Alongside lifting the state of emergency, the government created a package of
initiatives to decrease unemployment in Algeria, which was also a major complaint
among demonstrators (“Algeria To End”). Bouteflika also allowed court trials for
“assigned residence” detainees and sent a number of the prisoners to official detention
facilities. These were significant concessions for Algerians because it provided fair trials
and legal facilities for some detainees (“World Report 2012”). Even so, Algerian citizens
were complaining about the government’s failure to make sufficient reforms. For
example, Mustafa Bouchachi, Algerian Human Rights League chairman, said, “‘we need
a real opening up for political, media and social activities so that the people can
experience democracy for themselves”’ (“Algeria To End”) Also, even though the
emergency rule was lifted, new laws were adopted to allow the military involvement in
domestic security. Not to mention, the government explained how the protesters were still
banned from holding demonstration marches in Algiers (“Algeria To End”).
Along with the lift on the state of emergency, the government approved plans to
combat unemployment in Algeria. The first part of the package included a 100 billion
Algerian dinars specified for public banks for the purpose of long-term business
investments. The second part of the package consisted of measurements to encourage
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employment through the reduction of business social security handouts. Lastly, the
Algerian government agreed on “promoting the farming sector, one of the country's
biggest employers, by offering low-interest loans to farmers and making it easier for
domestic companies to lease farmland” (“Algeria To End”). The Algerian government
claimed unemployment was at about ten percent, but these measures would reduce the
rate (“Algeria To End”).
On April 14, 2011, Bouteflika announced he would make a number of changes,
such as constitutional amendments and laws concerning elections, the media, and
political parties (“Algeria: Crackdown”). This was Bouteflika’s initiative to ensure a
representative democracy (Chikhi). He claimed that he would do it through a
constitutional commission (“Arab Uprising”). Bouteflika also touched upon his promises
for free elections, as well as his willingness to halt the detainment of journalists. “In a 30
minute speech, Bouteflika announced he would change the electoral law in Algeria,
which is due to hold the next presidential election in 2014” and he said “‘all measures
will be taken to ensure free and fair elections including supervision by international
observers’” (Chikhi). Algeria’s president promised he would enact a new information
law, as Algerians were upset with the existing law that enables authorities to jail
journalists writing about their opposition to Bouteflika and fine them up to 250,000
dinars (Chikhi).
In July of 2011, the Algerian government made a few more concessions. This
time, the Algerian parliament agreed to remove prison terms with the revision of two
parts in the press code. These prison terms regard those that are sentenced for slandering
the president or any state institutions. This did not include prison fines. Later in
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September of 2011, a draft press code was approved by the Council of Ministers. This
was a big step for the government because prison sentences for verbal offences would be
eliminated if the code were adopted (“World Report 2012”).
Aside from some of the concessions the Algerian government has made, Algerian
authorities have employed many additional tactics to quell the protests. For example, in
May of 2012, leading up to the elections, Algerian security forces arrested and detained
many of the demonstrators in Algiers. The security forces also deployed during the week
of elections to prevent possible demonstrators from entering the capital. “Security forces
in the capital have taken pre-emptive measures and used force against groups who have
tried to defy the ban on demonstrations in the capital, especially when the purpose of the
demonstration was considered politically sensitive” (“Algeria: Crackdown”). The
security forces tried blocking anyone from entering the areas of planned protests. Once
protesters made their way into the site, the Algerian forces dispersed the demonstrators
and arrested them. A number of the protesters were then held in police stations for many
hours (“Algeria: Crackdown”).
Algeria also made the effort to establish the appearance of free and fair elections
during May of 2012. According to news sources, Algeria’s parliamentary elections in
May of 2012, where the National Liberation Front (FLN) won, were considered its most
legitimate elections in years. “A wide range of candidates took part after the president
approved the establishment of 23 new political parties” (“Arab Uprising”). Even Hilary
Clinton applauded the election as a path towards reform in allowing Algerians to express
their opinion. Even though many Algerians boycotted the elections, the announcements
helped stabilize the regime and portray the elections as legitimate. The Algerian
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government also took substantial steps to establish free and fair elections. For example,
the Algerian government allowed the EU observers to monitor the polls for transparency
(Lowe). The Algerian government has also since made efforts to appease the Algerian
citizens with a public spending program funded by its oil and gas exports. This was an
effort to fix social and economic problems that have led to many protests in Algeria
(“Arab Uprising”).
Theories
Similar to Jordan, theorists have debated the reasons as to why Algeria’s regime
continues to endure, even after the Arab Spring. Algeria has also faced a number of
protests over the post couple of years but the regime still stands to this day. Most of the
debated arguments about Algeria’s endurance fall under the topic of historical, military,
economic, political, demographic, and geographic reasons.
In regards to historical reasons, one of the most widely argued theories among
scholars as to why Algeria’s regime still exists today is its historical legitimacy that has
created unity among the country. The French first colonized Algeria in 1830. This led to
eight years of war between Algerian citizens and the French, as they were desperate for
independence. The National Liberation Front led the fight against the French and brutal
fighting took place, resulting in a large number of deaths. Algeria finally received
independence in 1962, but “the physical costs of the war were immense with a death toll
in the hundreds of thousands, 3 million Algerians displaced, and villages and
infrastructure destroyed. To make matters worse, with the enemy defeated, a power
struggle then commenced between the disparate leaders of the revolution” (Barr 52). This
led to purgings of French residents and Algerians supportive of the French, upwards of
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one million, which resulted in mass bloodshed. Once the Algerians finally received
independence, Ahmed Ben Bella, a revolutionary leader, was elected as president until he
was ousted in a coup. A couple of FLN leaders took power and Houari Boumediene,
former Minister of Defense Colonel, led the Algerian government as a revolutionary
(Barr 52).
Unfortunately, the fighting did not stop once Boumediene transitioned as leader of
the Algerian government. “Boumediene took a pragmatic approach, making Islamic and
Arab identity pillars of a unified Algerian state, but at the same time maintained firm
state control over its practice” (Barr 53). Boumediene died shortly after taking power as
president, but Colonel Chadli Bendjedid replaced Boumediene. Bendjedid was unable to
satisfy the Algerian population, as his policies led to economic deterioration. Brutal riots
started to occur in 1988, which led to inclusive politics. A number of opposition parties
started to emerge, such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The FIS quickly gained
popularity and became a notable political party to Algerians. “When FIS undisputedly
took the lead in national elections, the army annulled the results and commenced a
crackdown on the Islamists. Driven underground, the Islamists were subject to mass
arrests, torture, disappearances, and deportation to the Sahara” (Barr 53).
These brutal measures led the Islamists to respond with terrorist attacks targeting
innocent civilians and Algerian intellectuals. Many initiatives failed to solve this conflict
and brutal fighting lasted until the 1990s. Over 100,000 people were killed. The
government finally took control and the violence ended once the armed wing of the FIS
was disbanded in January of 2000. Ultimately, through these historical events, the
government has been viewed as the legitimate protector of Algeria against threatening
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groups, such as the Islamist groups. The government has been able to instill unity among
Algerians and portray itself as a legitimate leader (Barr 54).
Lastly, in relation to historical events, Algerians are still traumatized by the
violence and bloodshed during the 1988 riots and past wars. “The ramifications of this
violence are still felt today, moreover, as over 7,000 ‘disappeared’ Algerians remain
unaccounted for. The fear that another popular revolution could result in similar
destruction is a very legitimate aspect of the Algerian psychology” (Barr 56). Therefore,
Algerians are unwilling to involve themselves in another uprising that could possibly lead
to more violence.
With regards to military reasons, scholars argue that the power of Algeria’s
security forces allow the regime to endure. Barr explains how the pouvoir militaire used
their coercive forces to the fullest with the army, security forces, and secret police during
the recent protests. “With the overwhelming force on the side of the ruling elites,
protesters knew that all that stood between them and the butt of a gun was the internal
cost benefit analysis of the ruling elites that determine whether it’s worth it” (Barr 62).
The Algerian citizens were even nervous about a possible crackdown by the military.
Although the military did not take this route, they banned and blocked protests with great
strength. A number of protests still occurred, but the security forces were able to
outnumber the insurgents many times. They even dispersed and beat protesters that made
their way beyond the barricades (Barr 62). Many times citizens are afraid of voicing their
concerns because the police are ordered to spread out and hold down every area
(Nossiter). When the demonstrators became violent, the police used tear gas (Barr 62).
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Ultimately, Barr argues that the Algerian military portrayed its significant strength during
the protests that helped the regime to endure.
To further strengthen Barr’s argument, Achy explains that not only is the Algerian
military extremely powerful, but it is also loyal to the government. “Officers are both
well-paid--they earn 65 percent more than average public civil servant (U.S. $470
compared to U.S. $280 per month)--and enjoy good career prospects, making it unlikely
they would turn against the government” (Achy). The number of security forces has even
increased immensely over the years. There are about 170 police officers today in Algeria,
while there were only about 50,000 officers in the 1990s. Algerian police officers have
not open fired on protesters, but they are certainly loyal to the Algerian government.
Aside from the military’s numbers, strength, and loyalty, it is more integrated into
Algeria’s politics compared to Egypt and Tunisia. Therefore, protesters would be unable
to change the regime, even if they ousted the president. “In addition, many general
officers manage the largest public-sector companies, giving them privileged access to
strategic sectors in the economy” (Achy). Overall, the Algerian military has exceptional
power that will allow the regime to endure.
Aside from the arguments regarding historical legitimacy and the military, many
theorists argue economic reasons for Algeria’s endurance. Some scholars point to the
idea of resource wealth. Algeria’s resource wealth mainly comes from its oil reserves.
“With its reserves of natural gas ranked 8th in the world and oil reserves at 16th, Algeria
has been able to keep debt to about 1% of GDP, amass large amounts of foreign currency,
and maintain a significant hydrocarbon stabilization fund” (Barr 54). Oil and natural gas
encompass about thirty percent of Algeria’s GDP, which essentially makes up Algeria’s
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economy. The Algerian government mainly spends this wealth on regime elites and
groups that keep the population in line, such as the military pouvoir. The Algerian
government even owns SONATRACH, a company dealing with hydrocarbon industries,
ranked number nine as the largest company in the world. This company completely
drives Algeria’s economy and wealth. “SONATRACH is the regime’s “most lucrative
source of patronage, privilege, and power,” making it integral to Algeria’s endurance
(Barr 54).
Algeria’s resource wealth came in especially handy during the protests, as the
government bought off some of the demonstrators. Bauer and Schiller explain how
Algeria hands out economic benefits, similar to the way Saudi Arabia does, to alleviate
all political demands (Bauer and Schiller 1). “Some analysts say that Algeria is different
from Egypt and Tunisia because its huge revenues from energy exports allow it to satisfy
many of its citizens' economic grievances, especially at a time when oil prices are around
$100 a barrel” (“Algeria Promises”). Achy argues that this was the best possible way to
handle the protests before they led to violence and brutal fighting. The resource wealth
was also allocated for food subsidies, raises for court clerks and municipal civil servants,
and interest-free loans for young entrepreneurs to start up their businesses. The young
entrepreneurs were also given tax exemptions for three-years, and “[reserved] a quota of
local public contracts for them” (Achy).
The government is also fairly generous about its youth-loan employment agency,
which has reduced tension among youths looking for money. For example, Souad
Gharabi, a young lawyer in Algiers, received a 7,000-dollar loan for her rent. “‘People
see there is the $200 billion,” said Hammouda Naccredine, another economist at the
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university, referring to Algeria’s cash reserves. ‘And they say, ‘How do I get it?’”
(Nossiter) Nossiter further reveals that Algeria holds 180 billion dollars in cash reserves
that are oil generated. These reserves and a government money program for oppositional
youth allow them to mitigate reform calls (Nossiter).
Aside from handouts to buy off the opposition, the government made economic
concessions. The government subsidized necessary goods, such as flour or butane gas
(Bauer and Schiller 2). Not to mention Bouteflika responded to some of the protests with
price cuts, mainly on some staple goods. “In addition, in a speech, Bouteflika made vague
promises of future political and economic reforms to tackle unemployment and other
economic disparities and exempted men 30 and older from mandatory military duty if
they have not already served” (Barr 63). Bouteflika also announced his plan to transfer
cash and furniture to impoverished families (Achy). These economic concessions were
able to meet the demands of many oppositional protesters and alleviate grievances that
were driving the unrest (Barr 63).
Scholars also argue political reasons for Algeria’s lasting regime. International
support is among these theories. Bouteflika was able to strengthen Algeria’s foreign
relations after he was elected in 1999. He opened up relations with the Middle East,
North Africa, and parts of the West (Barr 54). Algeria has exceptional relationships with
regional and international groups, as a contributing member of the Arab League and the
Organization of African Unity (OAU). Algeria also served as a non-permanent member
of the UN Security Council in 2004 and 2005. These supporters allow Algeria to express
itself as an authoritative regional power. The main foreign supporter for Algeria’s regime
has been Western alliances focusing on counter-terrorism. The terrorist group, Al-Qaeda
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has consistently targeted Algeria with suicide attacks, bombings, and kidnappings. Even
the UN headquarters in Algiers was bombed by Al-Qaeda in December of 2007. “Since
they mostly target the government and foreigners, it has created a common cause between
the West and the Algerian government and has resulted in a robust campaign of joint
counterterrorism initiatives” (Barr 55). Algeria has been able to team up with Western
alliances and gain international support from them through its common cause of counterterrorism.
On top of international support, Achy argues how internal disagreements have led
to a lack of protests and the endurance of Algeria’s regime. This is mainly in concern to
demonstrations. Opposition parties and youth groups attempted to create an ad-hoc
partnership, the National Coordination for Democratic Change (CNCD), as a way to
peacefully protest weekly together for reforms, but they turned out to be unsuccessful as
the groups formed many disagreements among their interests. “Internal disagreements
within the CNCD have already emerged between human rights organizations and trade
unions on the one hand, and political parties on the other. The bone of contention is on
maintaining demonstrations every Saturday in Algiers despite their ban by the regime”
(Achy).
In addition to international support and internal disagreements, many theorists
believe the government restrictions on opposition groups is a valid political argument.
Algeria operates as a multi-party system, but Bouteflika’s party, the National Liberation
Front FLN), commanded control over Algeria. The only other main parties under the
multi-party system consist of the “‘Presidential Alliance,’” such as the National Rally for
Democracy Party, which is run by the prime minister who abides by the president and
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oppositional parties. A number of the opposition parties do not even have the ability to
campaign, as the government denies them equal opportunities. These opposition parties
include the Workers’ Party and Party for Justice and Liberty. Aside from this issue,
Bouteflika has a complete monopoly on media sources to express himself as the only
reasonable candidate. “As a result, while members of the political parties may have been
in favor of political change, their ability to institute their demands through formal
procedures was quite limited” (Barr 59). The main opposition party did not even hold its
first formal protest until after months of demonstrations (Barr 59).
A number of oppositional groups still exist outside the formal sector, such as ones
in the business populace and civil society, but some theorists believe that these groups are
not unified enough to create a successful uprising. This is partially in regards to the
cleavages of Algerians’ ethnicities, but mainly because of disagreements amongst parties
in concern to the notion of religion in government (Barr 59-60). “In fact, some 60 groups
who would support democracy nonetheless prefer to accept restricted political rights in
order to prevent an Islamist takeover or chaos” (Barr 60). Once again, this is due to
Algerians’ fear of another brutal civil war, as the last one resulted in the deaths of
between a 100,000 and a hundred and 20,000 Algerians and therefore their desire for
change is limited (Achy). Nossiter explains, “tales of mutilated corpses and mass graves
remain common currency,” and thus they are not looking for another Islamist led bloody
repression (Nossiter). Alongside Nossiter, Byrne explains that Algerians are unwilling
and unable to stand up for democracy if it means another violent war, as they are still
scarred by the past (Byrne).
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As a result of disagreements over religion infused in the government, the
majority of the Algerian demonstrations have even compartmentalized into minor issues
that only represent the party organizing the protest (Barr 60). For example, each group
separately demonstrated in concern to a different interest, such as graduate students for
university reform and municipal civil servants for their own economic and social values.
The lack of common grievance resulted in unsuccessful protests that only mobilized
about 2,000 protesters for national calls (Achy). The protests started to lose steam when
the divided groups were unable to agree on a common cause and how to go about the
demonstrations (Barr 61).
The recent concessions made by Bouteflika also serve as major political reasons
among scholars for the endurance of Algeria’s regime. Aside from the price cuts of staple
goods and promises of reforms, Bouteflika’s lifting of the state of emergency rule quelled
some of the protests (Barr 63). Achy explains how the state of emergency lift was a major
change for the Algerians because it existed for nineteen years (Achy). Also, the lift was a
concession made by the government to prevent future protests (Lowe and Chikhi).
Furthermore, Bouteflika claimed that he would make changes to the constitution and
various electoral laws. He explained how these reforms would strengthen the multi-party
system (Barr 63). Lastly, Byrne argues that the recent concession of a new press law has
also helped the Algerian regime endure. The new law prohibits journalists from being
jailed if they “stray over certain red line sin their commentary on the state of the nation”
(Byrne). Many Algerians “believe it’s a step in the right direction and are more inclined
to wait and see, or put pressure on the regime in other ways” (Barr 63).

Berger 93
Furthermore, the geography and demographics of Algeria explain the endurance
of the country’s regime. Similar to Achy’s argument about internal disagreements,
because of its geography, Algeria’s citizens are unable to connect as well as those in
Tunisia because of two mountain ranges that divide its terrain. With regard to
demographics, there is a major cleavage in Algeria’s society, as many Algerians define
themselves as Arab and fifteen percent of the population identify themselves as Berber.
“This tension in recent years has centered on the predominantly Berber region of Kabylie
where activists have consistently demanded official recognition of their language,
Tamazight, compensation for the deaths of protesters, more economic development, and
greater regional autonomy” (Barr 56). Tamazight was acknowledged as the official
national language in 2001, but the issue still remains controversial between the two
groups. Therefore, Algeria’s society is unable to connect with one another successfully to
perform an effective uprising through a common cause (Barr 56).
Throughout the Arab Spring, Algeria’s regime has been able to survive, even
under various protests and rallies. Due to economic and political reasons, as well as being
inspired by the Arab Spring, Algeria’s citizens have demonstrated against the government
since December of 2010. With the use of various government tactics, such as
concessions, reforms, announcements, military strength, and historical legitimacy,
Algeria’s regime continues to endure and fight off the Arab Spring successfully.
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Conclusion

Jordan’s monarchy and Algeria’s republic are two different Arab authoritarian
regimes, but they both connect in many ways in regards to the post Arab spring protests,
government responses, and theories among scholars as to why each regime has endured.
Jordan and Algeria’s regimes encompass many factors that allow various other Arab
authoritarian regimes to last. Overall, similar to many other Arab authoritarian regimes,
Jordan and Algeria have endured for many years and continue to do so.
The Protests
The various protests that occurred over the past few years in Jordan and Algeria
pointed to a number of similarities with regards to the causes and demands. Most of these
common causes fall under the areas of economic reasons, living standards, corruption,
and the lack of general ideals. As for economic causes, rising prices were huge factors in
both Jordan and Algeria. These concerns arose multiple times amongst the antigovernment protesters, especially in the first protests post Arab Spring. Jordan’s
protesters were more concerned with the rise in fuel prices, while Algeria’s protesters
were angered by the rise in food staples. Along with rising prices, citizens under each
regime protested the lack of jobs, unemployment, and general economic conditions.
These issues had been concerns amongst Jordanians and Algerians for quite some time,
but the Arab Spring inspired them to protest about it.
Aside from economic causes, living standards were popular arguments with
protesters under each regime. Living standards were concerns amongst tribesmen in
Jordan, but the issue pertained more to Algerian citizens. A number of demonstrations
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were organized in reference to housing issues in Algeria over the past few years,
including one of the first protests inspired by the Tunisian protest. Algerians were upset
with the government’s threat to relocate neighborhoods, bulldoze illegal houses, and
general housing shortages that has consequently forced young adults to live with their
parents. In addition, Jordanians and Algerians have formed demonstrations in response to
government corruption. The problem with government corruption was brought up in
Jordan more so than Algeria, but was a common cause nonetheless.
Jordanians and Algerians have similar concerns with regards to general ideals.
Citizens under each regime strive for freedom, democracy, and development. Protesters
have brought up these concerns many times in demonstrations, even if they were not
organized for those particular reasons. Overall, protesters in Jordan and Algeria called for
reforms, rather than an end to the monarchy. A few radical protests in each country called
for an end to the monarchy and ousting the leaders, but the majority of the
demonstrations were linked to demands for general reforms.
Jordanian protesters had a number of common causes for demonstrations with
Algerians, but there were also a number of concerns did not overlap. The grievances
specific to Jordan include economic and political reasons. One of the economic reasons
falls under the concern of job creation. Similar to Jordanians, Algerians complained about
unemployment rates, but Jordanian citizens also formed a couple of protests calling for
job creation specifically for tribesmen. This is a not a huge difference, however it can still
be noted as distinct concern separate from Algeria. Aside from the demand of jobs for
tribesmen inflation was another reason for protests in Jordan.
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Under political reasons, many Jordanians demanded the resignation of the prime
minister and the dissolution of parliament altogether. This was a high concern amongst
Jordanian protests and came up in the majority of the protests. Demonstrators called for
the Prime Minster to resign after a new one was appointed by King Abdullah II. This led
to another grievance with the Jordanian protesters, the king’s constant willingness to
reshuffle the government around. A number of Jordanians caught on to King Abdullah
II’s political strategy of reshuffling parliament to quell the demonstrations and riots. This
is similar to a number of protests that were organized as a result of their discontent with
minor political reforms that were cosmetic rather than substantial. Furthermore, the issues
of prime ministers and changing parliaments have led protesters to demand an elected
government and more political say. Jordanian started calling for the prime minister to be
elected by the parliament rather than King Abdullah II.
In addition to government issues, demands for constitutional change and
democratic laws have been common among Jordanian protests. These reflect the similar
common causes between Jordanian and Algerians, as they both expressed their interests
in democracy and freedom. Lastly, a couple of protests occurred with regards to the
United States’ inconsistent policy and Israel’s mission. These protests did not occur many
times, but they were distinct to Jordan nonetheless.
Similar to Jordan, Algeria faced a number of protests that did not overlap with
causes in Jordan. These protests fall under economic, political, and educational
categories. With regards to the economic causes, Algerians organized a couple of
demonstrations with concern to specific economic issues. These included the lack of
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Algerian unemployment benefits and medical benefits, and low income for Communal
Guards, and the low wages for the Algerian Municipal Guards.
Under political reasons, Algerians protested in a specific manner that mimicked
incidents in Tunisia. A number of Algerians performed self-immolations to get the
attention of the government. A number of these self-immolations occurred in response to
the lack of political reforms in Algeria. In addition, Algerians were angered by the
government ban on protests and the unwillingness of Bouteflika to lift the nineteen-yearold state of emergency rule. This is similar to a number of demonstrations that expressed
their concern for the restrictions on political protests. Under the educational category,
Algeria faced a protest by university students demanding better teaching quality. The
students protested for better education and an end to the qualification system. The
educational concerns only came up once in the protests, but created a distinction between
the demonstrations in Jordan and Algeria.
Jordan’s protests were by far more organized than Algeria’s protests. The Muslim
Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front organized most of Jordan’s protests, while a
specific group or party did not organize a number of Algeria’s protests at all. Alongside
the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front, leftists groups, Baathist parties,
the “March 24th Movement,” tribal youth activists, the Constitutional Monarchy
Movement, and the National Reform Front took charge of organizing protests in Jordan
with similar demands. Aside from these groups, the ultra conservative Salafi Movement
organized one protest calling for Islamic Sharia law to rule Jordan. Also, labor groups
and Islamists arranged protests with concern to Israel’s mission and Jordan’s peace
agreement with Israel.
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Distinct groups or parties did not organize Algeria’s protests until a couple
months into the Arab Spring. The groups organized protests consisted of the Rally for
Culture and Democracy (RCD), Algerian League for Defense of Human Rights
(LADDH), Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNCD), Zionist groups, and an
umbrella group consisting of human rights leaders, lawyers, and unionists. University
students, young males, radical Islamists, terrorist groups, the Algerian Communal
Guards, and the Algerian Municipal Guards assembled the rest of the demonstrations.
With regards to location, Algeria’s protests were more widespread and occurred
in a number of local areas. Regardless, Jordan faced a number of widespread protests,
including ones in a number of tribal areas. For Jordan, the majority of protests occurred
in Amman. The rest of the protests mainly occurred in Salhub, Karak, Dhiban, Maan,
tribal areas, such as Tafileh, and Northern areas, such as Irbid, Jerash, and Ajlun. For
Algeria, the majority of the protests occurred in Algiers. The rest of the demonstrations
occurred in Ennakhil, Diar el Babor, Cervantes, Msila, Tipaza province, Tebessa
province, Anaba, Tlemcen, Oran, Diar el Mahsoul, Qued Koriche, villages in Azazga,
Zeralda, Esharaqa, Tibaza, Bab el-Oued, Les Palmiers, Bejaja, and Eastern cities, such as
Jiel, Setif, Bouira, and Constantine. Similarly, the majority of protests occurred in the
capital cities. The demonstrations in the capital regions were also the largest ones in each
country. Protesters in Jordan and Algeria organized demonstrations outside the capital
and outside mosques. Also, in both Jordan and Algeria, protesters organized
demonstrations after Friday prayers.
Between Algeria and Jordan, quite a number of injuries took place. Algeria’s
protests were more violent overall, therefore producing more injuries. Even though more
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injuries were produced in Algeria’s violent protests, more clashes between government
supporters and government protesters occurred in Jordan. Overall, there were about eight
different occasions where clashes occurred in Jordan. The injuries usually occurred as a
result of violent actions, such as government supporters throwing stones at government
protesters, and vice versa. Some of the clashes were bloody and Jordanians in critical
condition. Police officers were also critically injured in one of the clashes. There was
only one death reported in all of the clashes.
From the start Algeria’s protests were more violent than those Jordan. For the
most part the clashes did not occur between the government supporters and the
government protesters. Only a few government supporters participated in the protests.
The clashes mainly occurred between the government protesters and the police officers.
A number of the injuries and deaths were also produced through self-immolations, which
did not occur in Jordan. In most cases, the Algerian police officers were more injured
than the Algerian civilians. One of the riots produced over four hundred injuries and on
many cases people were in critical condition from the clashes. Most of the time, the
violent government protesters threw petrol bombs, Molotov cocktails, hard objects, and
stones. A number of deaths also resulted form the clashes between the protesters and the
police officers, one as a result of a bomb attack committed by a terrorist group on
military patrol. Many times protesters also ransacked buildings and police headquarters,
set cars on fire, threw bricks at Algerian forces, and broke into post offices and schools,
which also took place in Jordan, but more so in Algeria. Overall, Algeria’s protests were
much more violent than Jordan’s protests, as a number of Algerian’s believed that
violence was the only way to bring about reform.
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With regards to security, police officers in Jordan and Algeria handled the
protests and riots similarly. In both cases the government mobilized the police officers in
mass numbers for all of the protests. They were sent out to standby, mediate the situation,
and practice restraint. In both countries, the police officers ended up using tear gas and
weapons to break up the violent riots many times, especially when the government
protesters attacked the police officers. Specifically in Jordan, the police open fired at a
major riot on November 13, 2012. In both cases, the police officers made many arrests
and detained a large number of protesters. In Algeria the police officers blocked off the
capital city with barricades to prevent organized demonstrations.
Government Responses
Similar to the protests, there are a number of similarities and differences between
the government responses in Jordan and Algeria. With regards to the common
government responses under the two regimes, there were many similarities. Under
economic responses, both the Jordanian and the Algerian regimes presented packages of
initiatives to deal with the protesters issues with unemployment and rising prices. In
Jordan, a 225 million dollar package was created in fuel prices and food staples for
Jordanian citizens. Similar to this, an economic package was assembled in Algeria to
decrease unemployment with benefits such as money for public banks to invest in
businesses.
With regards to political responses, both Jordan and Algeria lifted long lasting
laws in regards to protests. In Jordan, King Abdullah II revised the Public Gatherings
Law, which allowed citizens to demonstrate without the permission of the government. In
Algeria, the nineteen-year-old state of emergency law was lifted. Each of these laws still
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came with restrictions, but they were still considered huge steps for each country, as they
were tangible reforms. Jordan and Algeria also made efforts to establish freer and fairer
elections. Jordan’s king made a number of initiatives to reform the election process.
These initiatives included constitutional changes, such as the creation of an Independent
Elections Commission and a new electoral law. Even so, a number of the reforms dealt
with surface problems and only appeared to be substantive.
Some of the promises that Jordan’s king made consisted of reforming the electoral
process, where cabinets would be created based on the majority of the elected parliament,
revisions of election laws, and the creation of an independent council that would
administer parliamentary elections. Aside from the promises, Jordan’s king also made
tangible efforts to reform the election process, such as, calling meetings to deal with
election corruption, conducting personal meetings with the Independent Election
Commission to ensure transparency and fairness in the election, and setting three
conditions to guarantee effective and fair elections. The Algerian government did not
make as many efforts to ensure transparent elections, but Bouteflika appeared to have
established fairer elections and made promises to revise the laws for elections to ensure a
representative democracy. Bouteflika never revised any of the election laws, but he did
allow EU observers to monitor the polls for transparency. Finally, Jordan and Algeria’s
political responses overlapped through their promises for constitutional amendments.
Jordan’s king even went further and announced that he would create a National Dialogue
Committee, where proposals to the constitution would be drawn up. Jordan’s king
successfully followed up on this promised and constitutional laws were created to
develop Jordan.
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Similarities were also viewed in Jordan and Algeria’s efforts to make promises
and announcements to quell the protests and deal with surface problems, although these
responses were distinct to each country. In regards to Jordan, King Abdullah II first made
promises that he would start to include the Islamic Action Front and Islamist groups into
the government more. King Abdullah II also made promises for economic and political
reforms at National Unity Day. Jordan’s king promised that he would look into a
resolution to the corruption problem and allow parliament to finally elect the prime
minster next year. In regards to Algeria, Bouteflika made announcements and promises
that he would decrease food prices and allow Algerians better access to the media.
Specifically in Jordan, a number of tangible reforms were created to deal with the
protesters and develop the country. Abdullah II’s main political strategy was to reshuffle
the government. Since the protests started in 2011, Jordan’s king has appointed three new
prime ministers. A number of the prime ministers had even served in the past, which
reveals his lack of commitment to real change. King Abdullah II also completely
dissolved parliament in October of 2012. With regards to replacements, Jordan’s king
hired a new intelligence chief because citizens were complaining that the current chief
was using illegal intimidation methods. To further political initiatives, King Abdullah II
called for a National Unity Day, where he expressed his thoughts about Jordan’s future
and developments the government was working on, such as ways to better education. In
concern to economic efforts, aside from the economic package, King Abdullah II
increased wages for civil servants and those in the army.
The Algerian government responded to the protests in a number of unique ways.
The Algerian government used religious leaders to calm down protesters. Bouteflika also

Berger 103
requested Algerians to demonstrate peacefully, but also threatened them with detainment
and punishments if they did not follow the rules. The Algerian government followed up
with these threats a number of times and arrested a number of rioters. Aside from the
arrests, the Algerian police officers also prevented protesters from entering the capital if
they suspected a planned demonstration. With regards to concessions, the Algerian
government removed prison terms for those that slander the president or government
institutions.
Theories
A number of theories have been drawn up amongst scholars about the reasons as
to why Arab authoritarian regimes have remained intact post-Arab Spring. Some of these
theories have been specific to Jordan and Algeria, while some of these arguments have
overlapped between the two countries. General arguments concerning all of the Arab
authoritarian regimes also connect to both Jordan and Algeria, pointing to strong
conclusions about Arab authoritarian endurance. With concern to reasons distinct to
Jordan, arguments all fall under political initiatives. Symbolism has been a significant
belief among scholars. Many times, King Abdullah II uses democratic language in his
speeches and engages in symbolic acts to make it seem as if he is developing Jordan and
moving towards reforms. It is also evident that King Abdullah II presents himself as a
non-partisan leader, but will blame the government consistently for unpopular reforms.
Lastly, King Abdullah II constantly reshuffles the Jordanian government and appoints
new prime ministers every so often to appease protesters. Since the Arab Spring, Jordan’s
king has appointed three new prime ministers and dissolved parliament right before
elections.
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Theorists have made arguments about a number of reforms and initiatives to keep
protesters from taking down the Algerian regime. These arguments have fallen under
economic, geographical, and demographical reasons. As far as economic reasons go,
Algeria’s oil and natural gas reserves make up its economy and strengthen the regime.
Algeria’s government owns SONATRACH, the ninth largest company in the world.
Overall, Algeria’s resource wealth has allowed it to thrive as a strong economic regime.
Aside from economic reasons, the geography of Algeria is distinctive to its endurance.
Algeria is made up of mountain ranges that divide terrain, creating major cleavages
between groups that are unable to connect. Similarly, demographics have split up Arabs
and Berbers. The Arabs and Berbers constantly argue, rather than focusing on common
grievances. Ultimately, the Arabs and Berbers are unable to come together to form an
opposition group.
Aside from distinct theories for each country, scholars have overlapped in their
arguments for both Jordan and Algeria’s endurance. These arguments fall under political
reasons. One of the overlapping political arguments is the creation of reforms and
promises. Both Bouteflika and Abdullah II have made countless reforms and
announcements to appease the oppositions groups. For example, Jordan revised the
Public Gatherings Law, while Algeria lifted the State of Emergency. Bouteflika and
Abdullah II have also called for democratic change and constitutional amendments. They
have not always followed through with their initiatives, but the promises have quieted the
protesters. It is also evident that the Jordanian and Algerian regimes have placed many
restrictions on protests that led to unsuccessful protests.
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The governments use the threat of chaos as a political tool to keep citizens in line.
Abdullah II and Bouteflika consistently use their own government as the main mediator
between rival groups. Both leaders have expressed their “concerns” for the public if the
regimes were to fall, as the destruction can lead to violent power struggles between rival
groups within the states. Abdullah II and Bouteflika have even noted that powerful
Western countries can take advantage of the countries if they were to be ousted. Algeria’s
government uses the threat of chaos, even more so than Jordan’s government. Algerians
are constantly reminded about the threat of radical Islamic takeover, as they faced a
brutal civil war in the past with extreme Islamists. Bouteflika is viewed as a legitimate
ruler compared to Islamic groups, and therefore Algerians do not want to risk chaos with
a revolution.
Finally, the issue of societal cleavages is a political argument for both Jordan and
Algeria’s endurance. Jordan’s regime magnifies the societal cleavages as a political tool,
while the societal cleavages in Algeria naturally cause a problem for opposition groups.
In Jordan, the societal cleaves occur among Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians,
as well as among government supporters and government opponents. The government
exacerbates the notion that Palestinian Jordanians are considered to be “less Jordanian”
by Transjordanians, making Palestinian Jordanians less loyal to the monarchy and the
state. The Jordanian government also embraces the government supporters, rendering the
government opponents as weak political forces.
The theories for Jordan and Algeria’s endurance overlap with arguments between
scholars about the endurance of all Arab authoritarian regimes prior to the Arab Spring.
These theories were revealed in the literature review. These arguments fall under the
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categories political, security, and economic reasons. In terms of political reasons,
scholars argue that Arab authoritarian regimes are able to endure due to their legitimate
appearance. They create the image of success and popularity. This relates to Jordan, as
many theorists explain how Jordan’s regime lasts due to traditional legitimacy. As a
monarchy, Jordan is rooted in early Islamic history and has followed an Islamic lineage.
Jordanians are not willing to take down a regime that traces back to the Prophet
Mohammad with religious authority. Scholars believe that Algeria prevailed due to
legitimacy, but more so due to historical legitimacy. Due to Algeria’s past bloody civil
wars, Algerians are scarred by violence, destruction, and terrorist attacks. Not only does
these wars trigger feelings of nationalism, but also Algerians are not willing to start a
revolution as a result of these historical events. Algeria now has an elected leader that is
viewed as legitimate because he works to fight off threatening and terrorist radical
groups.
Patrimonialism is also a common argument among scholars for Arab authoritarian
regimes, including Jordan and Algeria. In regards to Jordan, the citizens are often times
bought off in various ways from its influx of foreign aid. The Jordanian government sets
up top down approaches where foreign aid is given out to the population to appease the
protesters. Jordan’s government also created jobs in the public sector to buy off its
citizens. With regards to Algeria, the government buys off its opposition groups with
money from oil and natural gas reserves. Often times the government spends the money
on regime elites and groups, such as the military pouvoir, to keep the population in line.
They also buy off the protesters with the oil reserve wealth to satisfy economic
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grievances. The Algerian government uses the resource wealth for food subsidies, wages
to court clerics and municipal servants, young entrepreneurs, and youth loans.
In addition to patrimonialism, the multi-party system is a popular political
argument among theorists for Arab authoritarian regimes that overlaps with Jordan and
Algeria. This allows for the inclusion of opposition groups into government, but places
various restrictions on them that does not allow them to move anywhere under the
system. For example, scholars have pointed out that most Arab authoritarian regimes
have a monopoly on the media, which restricts opposition groups from campaigning. In
Jordan, opposition groups and business elites are included in parliament. Since their
inclusion, they have become loyal to the regime, which guarantees the endurance of
Jordan’s regime. Algeria’s multi-party system provides support for the regime, as
Bouteflika’s party commands control, the prime minister runs the Presidential Alliance,
and the opposition parties are unable to campaign.
In addition to patrimonialism and the multi-party system, Western and
international support is a significant political reason for the endurance of Arab
authoritarianism that applies to Jordan and Algeria. As explained earlier, Jordan has great
relations with many Western countries, such as the United States, and receives support in
the form of foreign aid. Algeria has a lot of international support from many different
areas. Ever since 1999, Algeria has had great relations with the Middle East, North
Africa, and the West. Algeria is also a member of the Arab League, OAU, and was
formally a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2004 and
2005. Most importantly, Algeria has formed Western alliances to focus on
counterterrorism efforts.
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Lastly, among political reasons, the lack of ability to coordinate among
oppositions groups has helped Arab regimes endure. In Algeria, the CNCD was the most
organized opposition party during the post Arab spring protests, but there were too many
internal disagreements among the organization. Also, oppositions groups outside the
Algerian government disagree on the role of religion in government and how they should
organize protests, which does not allow them to come together and form common
grievances and effective coalitions. In general, Langhor believes there is too much civil
society in Arab regimes, which takes away from the participation in political parties. She
argues how citizens under Arab authoritarian regimes take too much of a role in nongovernmental organizations and other groups, which appeal to specific interests.
Therefore, there is a lack of mobilization because citizens do not come together for
common interests. In opposition, Whitaker believes civil society is too weak because
groups do not have enough power and resources to form successful protests. Overall,
citizens under Arab authoritarian regimes are unable to come together on the basis of
common grievances.
On top of the legitimacy and political reasons, scholars argue security reasons for
the endurance of Arab authoritarian regimes that overlap with Jordan and Algeria. Under
most Arab authoritarian regimes, the security forces are coercive and strong. A number of
the Arab regimes have an army, security forces, and secret police that all contribute its
strength. The secret police will listen, spy, arrest, interrogate, and restrict activity, leading
to unsuccessful protests and fearful citizens. In both Algeria and Jordan, the security
forces fight off the protesters with their coercive force and power. In Jordan, the General
Intelligence Department and secret police take charge as security forces, while the
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pouvoir militare take command as security forces in Algeria. All of these security forces
have banned and blocked protests, armed themselves with weapons, beat rioters with
batons, used tear gas to break up protests, and detained protesters. Algerians have
expressed fear of a military crackdown, which limited their engagement in protests and
secret political activity. Jordanians have been fearful of voicing their concerns because of
the military and secret police around. Bellin explains how the coercive apparatus of the
states remains effective and coherent in the face of protesters.
In addition to security forces’ coercive apparatus and strength, the military is
completely loyal to the regimes. Most of Arab authoritarian regimes pay their security
forces very well, including Jordan and Algeria. In Algeria specifically, they are integrated
into the government politics. Therefore, the security forces would take over if the leader
were ever ousted, which encourages citizens to call for reforms rather than a full regime
change. Overall, with the exception of a couple of Arab authoritarian regimes, the
security forces remain loyal to the regimes and fight off opposition groups for the
survival of the governments.
Moreover, the literature review theories adequately explain the Jordanian and
Algerian post-Arab Spring cases. Although a number of overlapping theories applies to
Arab authoritarian regimes that have fallen to the Arab Spring uprisings, such as the
multi-party system, patrimonialism, resource wealth, international support, and coercive
security forces. For example, all of these arguments apply to Egyptian regime, which fell
to the Arab Spring revolution. Thus, post-Arab Spring theories that apply to Jordan and
Algerias’ endurance can be added to the literature review theories. These arguments
include, reforms and announcements, the threat of chaos without the presence of the
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regimes, and societal cleavages. There are also a number of literature review theories that
are not widely covered by theorists for Jordan and Algeria. These include the religion of
Islam, poor regimes that lead to poor education and low literacy rates, family honor, and
politicized education. Most of these theories still help us understand the cases of Jordan
and Algeria, but scholars did not focus on these areas when focusing on Jordan and
Algeria.
Overall, there are many similarities and differences amongst Jordan and Algeria’s
regimes. The linkages connect to many other Arab authoritarian regimes that continue to
endure to this day. The endurance of Arab authoritarian regimes is compelling, as the
case studies of Jordan and Algeria reveal many factors that support the stabilization of the
regimes and allow them to continue to do so.
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